Tag Sergio Osmeña

September 11, 1945 Tuesday

My family again visited me. Roxas came again. He told us he could not pardon Osmeña for stating that Quezon would have preferred death than cooperate with the Japanese.

August 27, 1945, Monday

We have just received the Free Philippines of August 23. It is reported therein that the Chinese troops will occupy various areas, among which is Hongkong. In the same paper there is an item to the effect that Premier Attlee of Great Britain stated before the House of Commons that plans for reestablishment of British Administration in Hongkong “are fully prepared”. Do the British mean to return Hongkong to the Chinese or not? Apparently, there is no such intention. Japan is being ordered to return all the lands she had acquired by force. Hongkong was occupied by the British against the will of the Chinese. Why should not it be restored to the Chinese? Such inconsistency has absolutely no justification.

Domei reports by radio the following statement by Laurel:

“In view of the reoccupation of the Philippine Islands by the United States and the reestablishment therein of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the acceptance by Japan of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 and the consequent termination of the Greater East Asia War, the Republic of the Philippines has ceased to exist.”

Gen. MacArthur on August 24, 1945 issued the following statement:

“On the 29th of December 1944, when I ordered the interment by the Army of the United States of citizens of the Philippines who voluntarily gave aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy, I stated that the military would relinquish control of such persons to civil authorities at the conclusion of hostilities. On V. J. Day, or shortly thereafter, in keeping with that statement I have directed this transfer of jurisdiction from military to civil authority.”

“This step is taken in the firm conviction that the Philippine Commonwealth Government is prepared to deal justly with those persons accused of collaboration, the crime of treason. I am sure that the democratic principles of which the Philippine Commonwealth Government is based will guarantee swift punishment for the guilty and equally swift exoneration for the innocent.”

General MacArthur also pointed out that the Army’s prompt relinquishment of jurisdiction over persons accused of collaboration is “in conformity with my previously expressed view that civil authority should be completely restored as quickly as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.”

Acting on Gen. MacArthur’s announcement, Pres. Osmeña, in a special message to Philippine Congress on August 24, 1945, recommended the creation of a Special Collegiate Court to try all collaborators.

The President stressed that the Court should be composed of judges of First Instance “who did not work under the Japanese or engage, directly or indirectly, in the buy-and-sell business with the enemy.”

Osmeña also proposed the appointment of a staff of special prosecutors, headed by the Solicitor General.

Decisions of the Special Collegiate Court would be appealable to the Supreme Court. He added:

“In view of the fact that some members of the high tribunal may be disqualified under the requirements specified, the President recommends that judges of the Court of First Instance be authorized to sit in the tribunal in lieu of the justices who may be disqualified.”

The above news came like a bombshell in this prison. Everybody was dumbfounded. Everybody was disappointed. Everyone of us of course would prefer to be accused and duly tried so that when our vindication comes, it will be accompanied by a formal declaration of our innocence. But in view of the special circumstances, we thought that another course would be taken. As America won the war with hardly any loss of time, we thought that America would be more magnanimous and just forget everything. Also, all the Filipinos seem to wish unity and we thought they would want to finish at once the collaboration issue as this is dividing our people. But it seems that Osmeña wishes to go ahead with our cases. We welcome such a decision and we will fight to the last ditch. Our faith in him is waivering and I am afraid that we will not be able to be with him. What a difference in attitude between Osmeña and General Tito of Yugoslavia and General de Gaulle of France.

What could be his motive? Some believe that he is ill-advised by those who hate the “collaborationists”. Some think that he feels that we will prejudice his candidacy as he assumes that the great majority of the “collaborationists” would be against him. Others are of the opinion that there is imposition on the part of the Americans in which case we will have to conclude that he is a weakling. Few others assert that Osmeña’s mind is already far from what it used to be and his judgment is not as accurate as it used to be. For my part, I am willing to give him the benefit of a doubt by preferring to believe that it is his duty to push our cases to the end after passing through certain proceedings.

So there is no amnesty.

Why did he have to recommend to Congress the creation of a Special Collegiate Court? Has he no confidence in the regular courts? Why did he have to provide that judges who served during the Japanese regime cannot sit in this Court? If he has no confidence in their impartiality and honesty, why did he reappoint them? This requirement leads us to think that he is interested in our conviction and he does not want to take any chances by allowing men who served in the former regime to take part in the proceedings. At any rate, his plan would delay our cases. I am sure that such a bill cannot immediately be approved in Congress, or may be disapproved. What happens then?

From the beginning, I feared that we might become victims of politics. This is the reason why I had been saying that we would not be released until after the elections of November. Now it may be the plan to hold us until after the elections to eliminate us from the elections.

We demand that we be given an immediate trial and that in the meanwhile we be allowed to be out on bail so that we can prepare our defense. Now we see the necessity of getting together, of organizing our own party so as to protect ourselves and fight those who caused us this martyrdom.

* * * * * *

Autograph hunting continues. People asking for our autographs are not only our companions, but many ladies in this community whom we had not met. It shows their sympathy towards us.

I cannot keep track of all of them. I shall only copy one or two.

To Miss Pino: “Although I have not had the pleasure of meeting you, I have heard so much about you that I feel as if I had known you for a long time. We are here bereft of the warmth of the hearts of our families, relatives and friends. If our suffering had not been as intense as it could have been, it is because we found persons whose kindness and sympathy toward us make us forget our pains and worries. To you more than anybody else we owe this consolation.”

In the afternoons, we are allowed to play games at the plaza or Colony Square. There is a school along the way and we usually stop to look at the girls and the teachers. Evidently, they know who we are. Whenever the opportunity arises, we engage them in lively and friendly conversation. I recall a Miss Pino, a very pretty girl. She sent us many gifts.

Col. Torillo: “My greatest satisfaction during our forced stay in Iwahig is that it gave me the pleasure and opportunity of knowing persons who can be a credit to any country. Among them is you, Col. Torillo, whom I have learned to like and to admire. The work assigned to you here is a most difficult and delicate one. You certainly acquitted yourself admirably.”

August 24, 1945, Friday

Information from the radio: A Japanese delegation arrived in Manila and left after all information required of them had been given.

The schedule is as follows:

MacArthur and staff will go to Tokyo on Tuesday, August 28.

Formal surrender document will be signed in Tokyo on Friday, August 31.

Truman announced V. J. Day will be declared upon signing of the surrender document. MacArthur announces that after V. J. Day, the collaborators will be turned over to the Commonwealth government, and he hopes that this government will forthwith take action to punish those who are found guilty and to exonerate those found not guilty.

I hope Osmeña will take action without any delay.

Noon: French, one of the internees working in the radioroom, reports that a radiogram has been received to the effect that many of us, the list of which will soon arrive here, will be taken to Manila to be delivered to the Bureau of Prisons now in Muntinglupa. Sison reports that someone told him that 14 of us will go by plane.

At about 10:00 p.m. when we were already in bed, Dr. Bunye came and told us that a radiogram had just been received from Manila asking how many M.P.’s are available to accompany collaborators to Manila. Many attach much importance to this telegram. To me it means nothing because it is the natural thing. The war having been concluded, we have to be taken to Manila to face trial or to be released. In case of a trial, I suppose we will be given the right to give bond.

We have become crazy here. Any significant affair is thoroughly discussed and given some significance generally favorable to us. We certainly indulge in a lot of wishful thinking.

August 23, 1945, Thursday

10:40 a.m. It was reported that the talk all over town was that we were all leaving on the 27th.

Serging Osmeña wrote a letter to his father about our views on his candidacy. It seems that he reported that everybody was inclined towards his father except two or three. As to Recto, Serging thinks he is opposed. Serging also doubts Alunan because of his relations with Roxas. Paredes, Zulueta and others have been joking Serging. They told him that we are all for his father, but that we insist Paredes be the candidate for Vice-President. The truth is that we have not made up our minds. All we agreed on was that we would endeavor to be united; that we would endeavor to vindicate ourselves; and that we would fight against everybody who had been against us. We will see the situation in Manila. We will also do our best to help in the rehabilitation of our country.

August 22, 1945, Wednesday

This is really a malaria-ridden region. Already over 30 of us are suffering from this terrible illness, among them Dean Bocobo and Mr. Abello. Some of them also suffer from some mental disorder probably as a result of the disease. If we are not taken away from here soon, I am afraid that we will all get sick.

I have read a magazine published August 13, 1945 by the Pacific General Headquarters of the U.S. Army. There is one very good article entitled “Facts Make for Friendship”. It praises the Filipino character. “Loyalty, courage and kindliness are virtues just as prized in the Philippines as in the United States. But considering the wide dissimilarity of racial backgrounds, climates, and environments, the wonder is that there is so much likeness between the two people…

“The great number of American servicemen spending lavishly increased the amount of circulation and this is of course the cause of sharp inflation. Military personnel can do much toward reduction of prices. Can anybody make deposits or send money home?”

The article praises the effective and valuable services of guerrillas. Regarding independence: “…but as the early terrible memory of Japanese cruelty recedes, it is probable that the full measure of statehood — unqualified by any of the restrictions inevitable under a dominion or commonwealth —will again become an almost unanimous desire.

“This is an old and popular misunderstanding among Americans, that our whole experience in the Islands has been an expensive, eleemosynary project. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

“From 1898 to 1940 the U.S. Government spent altogether somewhat more than a billion dollars on account of the Philippines. Spread over a period of four decades, this averages about $25 million a year — not too lavish a bounty. But $800 million of the total went to the American Army stationed in the Philippines; another $100 to the Navy; and our pacification of the Islands between May 1898 and June, 1902 cost $186,321,000. None of these large sums was spent for the direct benefit of the Filipinos. Other aid — 1903, $3 million for cholera relief; (they gave $10 million to Japan on account of the earthquake in 1923). For the Bureau of Insular Affairs and Resident Commissioner’s Office, $4 million, but the Philippine Government paid the salary and expenses of Philippine Governor General. Coast and Geodetic Survey got $6.5 million, and this is for benefit mostly of the United States. For Agriculture, a few hundred thousand dollars plus $6 million in benefit payments to sugar planters in 1934-1936. Refund of taxes collected in United States on Philippine goods average half a million a year. Excise tax is $120 for redemption of Philippine bonds. Aside from copra tax and the Military expenditures, these totals would hardly build a block on the Escolta. Even private American investment in the Philippines only total $200 million in 1935. Such figures do not justify terming the American experiment in the Philippines a past burden on the American taxpayer. For the future, whatever amount of aid the United States Congress decides to give them, one fact must be remembered. When the Japanese started their invasion in 1941, the Islands were American territory and entitled, as such, to American military protection. They didn’t get it, and our unpreparedness was the root cause of their desolution today.”

The article concluded with the following under the subheading: “They built up the Islands themselves.”

“Viewed in such a light, the Filipinos are sure to be seen as good, loyal friends of ours, who have suffered much in the common cause of rejecting aggression. They have maintained a regard as high as our own for the great heritage of Western culture. Their soldiers have fought bravely and well with pitifully meagre arms. Their people as a whole are now suffering the painful economic effects of price inflation, which weighs far more heavily on them than it does on the American Armed Forces. Finally, the terrific destruction visited on their cities and villages bespeaks our aid, not only on the ground of human sympathy, but of right.”

Coming from an American the above article is great. It does us justice.

The newspapers report that Marshal Premier Tito of Yugoslavia granted a general amnesty to all collaborators except war criminals. It is also reported that Marshal Petain was sentenced to death by the court but that De Gaulle commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.

The foregoing points the way to Osmeña. I believe he should issue a general amnesty. And this should be done immediately to further his presidential ambition. Some of us are getting impatient and it may be too late to win their sympathy if release is delayed. I believe there will be no objection to such action on the part of the Americans. At least I hope so. They have won the war almost without sacrifice of lives and they should be magnanimous to the Filipinos who in truth and in fact have always been their loyal allies.

This morning we all considered that everything was all over — finished. No more hope, no more illusions. Stock Exchange definitely closed as there were no more transactions. Zulueta remarked. “Tu gozo en el pozo,” It seems that the reported radiogram was a fake, a joke. It was certainly a bad, heartless and cruel joke. We suffer enough without it.

I regretted that I changed my attitude. I never paid attention to rumors before. I preferred to use my time doing something else like writing. I was happy. Now that I allowed myself to be carried or influenced by news, I cannot help but worry and suffer at times. My reason for changing was the fact that the war had ended abruptly without hardly any loss on the part the Americans and I thought the latter would be more magnanimous and just forget everything. Furthermore, Osmeña is an experienced, shrewd politician. I presumed that he would make a “master stroke” (goIpe) by just granting a general amnesty to all collaborators. This certainly will insure his election. I suggested to Serging that he write his father.

11:00 a.m. Zulueta arrived from the dentist’s office and he reports that Dr. Reyes, the dentist, said that last night while in the dance given in honor of Col. Gilfilan, Lt. Fernandez received a radiogram which he had not yet codified and which seemed to refer to us.

12:50 a.m. Paredes reports that the cook of Gilfilan stated that he had overheard a conversation to the effect that we were going to be released.

Notwithstanding the apparently reliable sources nobody paid attention to them.

9:00 p.m. Col. Gilfilan came to our quarters and bade us farewell. He was very nice and jovial but left no encouraging words. All hope vanished — general gloom.

August 18, 1945, Saturday

9:00 p.m. Since 8:00 p.m., a musical program has been going on to celebrate the birthday of Mr. F. C. de la Rama. In the midst of the intense celebration, Mr. Reyes, who with two other internees had been working in the radio office of the Army under Lt. Fernandez of the Signal Corps, suddenly broke into the crowd with a piece of paper in his hand. He beckoned aside Messrs. Paredes and De la Rama, and whispered to them that a radiogram had been decoded by them indicating that we would be released. He was looking for Chief Yulo who was not present at the party. When he went inside the quarters to look for Yulo, a few who were no longer interested in the program followed him. The radiogram as read by Chief Yulo went something like this: “Magic White. SS Mactan arriving tomorrow. Prepare war prisoners to be released.”

Great excitement! Everybody talking all at once! Pandemonium broke out, but everyone was prevailed upon to calm down as the news must be kept secret or confidential. Employees in the radio room are strictly prohibited from divulging contents of messages. The people could not contain themselves, however; they could not suppress their jubilation. But it was done as a part of the birthday celebration for Mr. de la Rama. The celebration became very boisterous and lively. The singers and poets became more inspired. De la Rama was requested to say a few words. He delivered a speech reminiscent of the Moriones meetings in Tondo. He was lavishly applauded. It was interpreted as a bid for election. It is known that he intends to present his candidacy for a district in Laguna. Some remarked that with his Tagalog oratory and his money he could be elected. He said something else which we appreciate very much. He counselled those in the B class to be united among themselves and with us, and to follow the leadership of the Filipino leaders with us. This seems to have impressed the crowd. The party ended with a grand rush for the cigarettes and cakes freely distributed by Mr. De la Rama.

After the program there were all kinds of comments. I stated that our release can be expected to come soon inasmuch as MacArthur clearly stated that we would be detained for the duration of the war as a measure of military security. Now that the war is ended, no further military security is involved.

It was also customary to recall past events to confirm, interpret or clarify the present event. It was recalled that while Col. Gilfilan was having an inspection this morning, he asked, “When do you want to leave?” This question was then taken as a joke. Now we believe that it was done in all seriousness as the Colonel already knew that we would soon be leaving.

We were so excited that very few of us were able to sleep that night. In the first class quarters, talk continued. I could have slept as I generally sleep well, but I purposely kept myself awake to hear a very important and interesting conversation — a conversation that may affect the future course of politics in the Philippines.

Yulo proposes that we be united, that we organize ourselves, and that we form a ticket for the next general election composed of Paredes for President and Alunan for Vice President. The others will run for the Senate or the House, preferably the latter. He said that he had already decided to retire from politics, but he was now determined to run because the leaders in Manila are hopelessly divided. If this ticket triumphs, our full vindication will have been realized. He thinks this ticket will be very strong. Osmeña and Roxas were both “pros” so that their forces would be divided. The people of Pres. Quezon are still intact and have not made their inclination known. They will rally behind the banner of this ticket. Doña Aurora de Quezon will be a very big factor in Philippine politics and she will undoubtedly support this ticket. Alunan and himself (Yulo) were rivals — if they got together there will be almost a unanimous vote in Negros. Paredes controls more votes in Ilocandia than Quirino who may be the vice presidential candidate in the Roxas ticket. A big percentage of the population is being accused of collaboration and this group will support the ticket. As to the platform, Paredes will draw in the radicals, whereas Alunan will attract the conservatives. Yulo and Alunan can count on the assistance of the Americans and other foreigners who also can wield powerful influence in the Philippines on account of their financial hold on Philippine economic life. Yulo reiterated that if this ticket is not launched and the leaders in Manila continue to be divided, he will retire from politics completely.

The reaction to Yulo’s plan was very favorable. Paredes and Alunan agreed that Yulo himself be the candidate. Alunan wanted to show that he is no less gallant than Yulo. Yulo, however, cut short all talk about his candidacy. Paredes was not displeased as he harbored ambition to be Chief Executive of the Philippines some day. Alunan also is not irrevocably opposed.

The entire group in the officer class, except two or three, is very enthusiastic. One of those who remains silent is Sen. Recto — he avoids the issue by just smiling. He continues to be a sphinx notwithstanding efforts to pump him. It may be that he also has political ambitions, although he insists that his intention is to quit politics and devote his time to his big law practice. Madrigal and Sabido not only are lukewarm, but have insinuated disconformity. This is probably due to the fact that they are too closely attached to Osmeña. They intimated that Paredes should be the vice president in Osmeña’s ticket.

Among the enlisted class, there is greater enthusiasm. Paredes has won their admiration with his virile attitude toward the Americans. They are proud of him because he has no inferiority complex towards the whites like many others, and he champions their rights and petitions even if his own privileges are endangered. There are some who show opposition, but they are very few. They are composed of professional non-conformists or “contrabidas” — always saying “yes” when everyone says “no”, and vice-versa, and those who for purely personal reasons hold a grudge against Paredes.

We got up early the next morning, all sleepy but full of hope.

August 16, 1945, Thursday

This morning, I modified my opinion as to when we will leave. I believe now that it will not be before the end of this month. It will be sometime in September or October. The reason for my change of view now is that I think Laurel, Aquino and Vargas, who are still in Japan, will be brought to the Philippines and I think their cases as well as the Ministers’ will be tried or investigated at the same time. Since the cases of those three or more serious, they may not be considered until after some time and, therefore, our cases will also be delayed.

It is reported by radio that Emperor Hirohito will fly to Manila, in a Japanese plane from Tokyo to Okinawa and in an American plane from Okinawa to Manila. MacArthur has been designated as Commander-in-Chief to receive the surrender of Japan. The representatives of the vanquished always come to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander or to the place indicated by the latter. MacArthur’s headquarters is in Manila; therefore, the Japanese Representative should go there. But why Hirohito precisely. I can’t understand why it cannot be Premier Suzuki. I do not believe the United Nations will deal with the Premier, however; he will probably be one of those to be arrested and accused as a war criminal. But his cabinet can fall and a Pacifist Cabinet could be created under the Premiership of Konoye, Konoye can then sign the peace terms. But it seems it has to be Hirohito. What a humiliation! Before, he was a proud ruler, considered as god himself. His words were law and divine order at the same time. Now he is under the orders of MacArthur.

I suggested to Compadre Serging Osmeña that he write a letter to his father. I so suggested because it seems that they are already in good terms. I explained to him that his father is an experienced and shrewd politician. Serging ought to know that just now his father is at a disadvantage as regards the collaborationists inasmuch as Roxas has openly thrown himself on their side. I told Serging that he write his father that there is discontent here on account of his passive attitude. He should suggest to his father to do something; to make a “golpe” (sensational and radical act) which will boost his stock among the “collaborationists” and such “golpe” should be a general amnesty proclamation freeing everybody accused of collaboration. This may incline the collaborationists to his side or at least put him in a better position to approach them later. I found Serging rather reluctant for reasons which he explained. The reasons involved family relations among the father, mother-in-law and Serging.

* * * * *

Excerpts from a letter of Roy W. Howard, the principal owner of Scripps-Howard newspapers, dated at Manila, July 30, 1945 to Arsenio Luz:

My chief purpose in coming here, aside from a desire to confer with Gen. MacArthur and get a picture of the general situation, was to see if I could be of any help to you. I wish that it were possible for me to report success, but after pursuing every line that is open, and discussing your case with everyone I know who might be in a position to help, I am afraid that as far as your immediate release is concerned, my effort has been a failure.

It is my sincere belief, Arsenio, that in spite of any action that can be taken, including even legal action, the group held in Palawan now will be kept there until the conclusion of the war with Japan. I realize that this is going to be very tough, and I doubt whether were I in your place it would be possible for me to reconcile myself to the belief that remaining there is the best course. But in my efforts I have run into a few facts which, without in any sense justifying the action taken against you, throw a light on the situation which I want to pass along to you.

In my efforts I have talked to Gen. MacArthur, Gen. Thorpe, head of the C.I.C., Pres. Osmeña, Manuel Roxas, Phil Buencamino, Salvador Araneta, Manolo Elizalde, Chick Parsons, Paul McNutt, and others. They have all been very sympathetic and have helped me to the best of their ability. But we have all run into a stone wall in that Gen. MacArthur is embarked on a course which I am convinced he believes to be in the best interest of the Filipinos, and from which I do not believe it is going to be possible to dissuade him. As I see it, the situation boils down to about this:

MacArthur is fighting a war and doing a most magnificent job of it. However, the job is one calling for the most intense concentration, and despite what I am sure is his keen realization of a pot of political and purely domestic needs, he is having a straight line and giving no consideration to any proposition except killing Japs.

I have no doubt that he suspects there are men at Palawan who are entirely innocent, and many who have been guilty of nothing more serious than indiscretion or bad judgment. To attempt to sort those men out, however, would, if justice were to be done, be equivalent to bringing about trials at this time. I can see many reasons why this would be inadvisable, the chief one being that at the rate of which feeling is dying down, it is obvious that there will be much less emotionalism attaching to collaboration trials later on, than would be the case today.

If trials were to be held today, they would of necessity be trials before an American military tribunal. I suspect Gen. MacArthur feels that not only will Filipino courts be more competent to judge Filipino psychology, but that Filipinos, knowing the conditions existing in Manila and the pressure that put to bear on people like yourself, will be infinitely more lenient than would be the case with a hard-boiled, wholly impersonal military court. In any event, Arsenio, at the end of the week’s effort, in which I have thrown in everything I have without obtaining any redress in your case, I am forced to say that I think that is the way the thing stands, and while Gen. MacArthur has promised to have prepared for his own personal consideration a review of your case, I do not honestly advise you to count on much of anything happening in consequence.

The real purpose in writing this letter is this: I do not need to tell you, I am sure, that my own faith in your innocence of any action prejudicial to the United States has never waned. That will not be either news or a surprise to you. What is more important, however, to you… something which I am not sure you fully appreciate is that no one from Gen, MacArthur down has expressed to me the slightest belief that any action which you took under the stress of occupation conditions was in any sense an action aimed against the interests of the United States, and no one to whom I have talked has expressed the slightest doubt of your loyalty to the United States and to your American friends. That goes straight, Arsenio, and without any discount.

To give you a complete picture, however, I must add that some of your friends, even though they are understanding and tolerant, feel that you may have on occasion been a bit indiscreet and not used your head as effectively as might have been the case. Everyone realizes, however, that hindsight is sometimes better than foresight, and I haven’t the slightest doubt that aside from the discomfit and inconvenience of being held in custody for the very few months during which this war is going to continue, you will ultimately be restored to complete standing in this community and given a complete bill of health.

If your old sense of humor is still working, and I have no doubt that you still possess it even though it may have been scuffed up a bit, you may smile at a line of reasoning which I have given Carmen, and which I put forward in all seriousness. I realize the ridiculousness of a man on the outside arguing to the man who is detained, on the virtues of being in jail, and yet I think in your case there is some virtue in the situation.

Let me explain: If it were possible to exercise any influence to get you sprung at the present time, and I had an opportunity to do so, I would advise you to turn your back on such an opportunity. My reasoning is this: if you were to come out under such circumstances and without a trial, there would always be hovering over you a suspicion that may be you were at liberty not because of innocence, but because of some pull you were able to exercise. Such a situation would be a handicap to you and your family for the rest of your life. On the basis of what I have been told, and I am not going to attempt to state here which man or men most influenced my judgment (although I assure you they were among your best friends and American well wishers), I believe that the hearing which you will certainly get immediately upon the conclusion of the war and the turning of this whole problem over to the Philippines, will give you a clean bill of health and completely establish your innocence of any action that would prejudice your standing either with Filipinos or Americans. For whatever my judgment is worth, the value of this bill of health and official establishment of your innocence will over the long haul more than compensate for the few additonal weeks or months that you may be denied your liberty.

As I said, this argument, sound though I am convinced it is, may be one easier for me to make on the outside than for you to accept on the inside. I know, however, that you will not doubt my honesty, even though you should doubt my judgment, when I tell you my opinion of the tremendous value which I believe will attach to your exoneration, as distinct from the situation which might result if you were released in consequence of political pressure, even though there was the possibility of exerting political pressure, a possibility which I am sure does not exist.

I would of course have come to Palawan to see you, had it been possible to do so. I even made some efforts in that direction, but became convinced that not only could I have been of no value to you down there, but to have made the trip might have in some degree prejudiced your case.

Now for one more point, and then I’ll wind up this interminably long letter. In April, before his death on August 1st, I visited President Quezon at Miami, Florida. At that time he was on his death bed and I think fully realized that his number was up. He talked with extreme difficulty and only in a whisper, because the tuberculosis had reached his throat. I won’t attempt to quote all of his conversation, but merely that which has a bearing on your situation, and on his unshakeable faith in you and confidence in your loyalty and integrity. There had at that time come back to the United States varied stories of collaborative action being taken by Filipinos. Cases discussed with a number of these people, some of whom I knew and others whose names had slipped me, but whom he insisted I had met and who knew me. Finally, he turned to me and said:

Roy, I do not know about all of these people. I am worried about Jorge Vargas. The reports on what Jorge is doing are not good, though I find it very difficult to believe that any one so long associated with me would turn out to be disloyal to me, to the Filipino people, and to the United States. I must admit that I am having to reserve judgment. About some of your friends, however, I would advise you to have faith, just as I have. There are some of them to whom disloyalty would be impossible and I include in this list Alunan, Joe Yulo, Arsenio Luz, Phil Buencamino…’

In addition he named those several others — people whom probably I would recognize if I saw them, but whose names at the time did not mean much to me.

Quezon told me at that time the instructions that he had left with his friends, and added that he was now in touch with those men by clandestine short wave radio. He also told me that within a week he had received a call from one of his men, a Filipino doctor, who had returned to the States from Manila within the preceding forthnight.

At home I have a diary memorandum which I wrote that night, in which I have Quezon’s exact words. The foregoing quotation, however, is to all intents and purposes correct and accurate.

…I am no seventh son of a seventh son, but I venture the prophecy that this war will be over before the end of the year and that your complete restoration to your family and to the position which you have so well earned in this community, will have been effected before the New Year is many days old.

Mr. Howard is one of the two or three great newspapermen in the United States now living. The news above is the most authoritative we have received inasmuch as it is the result of his personal conferences with MacArthur in whose hands our destiny lies. Therein it is clear that we will not be released while the war lasts. He believes that even if we can go now we should not accept it as there will always be the suspicion that we got out as a result of influence. Whereas if we are acquitted after due trial, we will be given a clean bill of health, and, therefore, be restored to our old position in the community. Such was my opinion from the beginning. We do not positively know what we are charged of. But under the circumstances, we presume that it must be treason to our country and disloyalty to the United States. As to the latter, I have never been disloyal to the United States but if they insist, I would not mind it because after all deep in my heart I do not recognize loyalty to any country other than my own. But the charge of treason to my country is very serious. From all indications at the present time, only prejudiced Filipinos believe that we have been traitors and they constitute a very small portion of our population. But how about future generations who do not know the facts personally? If our declaration of innocence now is not recorded, they may get the idea that we have done something against our country. So it is preferable that we be submitted to a trial in order that our formal vindication may be decreed if we are found not guilty.

August 15, 1945, Wednesday

9:20 a.m. News came that Hirohito signed the surrender document. War is ended.

But it is not in so far as we are concerned. We are still in prison. I predict that we will be out before the end of the month. No military security needing our further detention. Surely MacArthur will immediately turn us over to the Commonwealth. Osmeña is an experienced, shrewd politician. He understands or should understand that just now Roxas is in an enviable position in so far as the “collaborationists” are concerned. Therefore, Osmeña should and I think will do something to bolster up his stock to the collaborationists. May God make Osmeña see our case in this light.

August 6, 1945, Monday

We were visited or rather inspected by Lt. Col. Jaime Velasquez and Maj. Hanz Menzi, both of the Police Command. They seem to be ranking officers. What the purpose of their visit was, we do not know. They seemed to have been investigating our condition. Col. Velasquez is a graduate of various military schools in the United States and when the war broke out he was Aide-de-Camp to Pres. Quezon. He is one of our most brilliant officers. It had been repeatedly rumored that he had married a daughter of Pres. Quezon, Menzi is Swiss-born, but a naturalized Filipino, He was a guerrilla leader. For his guerrilla activities he was twice imprisoned at Fort Santiago. He is lucky to be still alive.

We had a long conversation with them. One thing we got clear is that we can never hope to get out of this place until after the termination of the war. We will not even be transferred to Los Baños. We appreciate their frankness. Now we can cease dreaming.

Today Sergio Osmeña, Jr., son of Pres. Osmeña, arrived alone. He came from Muntinglupa. He was detained, I suppose, for his buy and sell business during the Japanese occupation. He was very thin. He was taken to our quarters and given a bed there. Later, it was discovered that he belonged to the enlisted class and he was transferred to the quarters of that class. It was quite a humiliation. I do not know how they make the classification as there are others like him who are in our class. I was tempted to write about his case to his father since Serging, Jr. is a very intimate friend and a compadre of mine. I was also quite intimate with his father, but on second thought I desisted as I do not know what the reaction of Pres. Osmeña under the circumstances. Serging has developed a little fever. I hope he gets well soon.

He showed me the letter which I have mentioned somewhere in this diary, that he wrote when statements of his father concerning him and his brother Nick were published in the papers. In effect, the President compared Serging and Nick to his son, Emilio who was killed by the Japanese for refusing to collaborate. Serging’s letter made me cry. As I’ve said before, even under the circumstances, I do not believe I could do what Serging did. A father should be respected and loved by his son no matter what he does.

Paredes received a copy of a letter dated May 20, 1945 which Atty. Pastrana of Capiz sent Pres. Osmeña. It was one of the most convincing in defense of the collaborationists.

Rev. Enrique Sobrepeña, a Chaplain Major in the Philippine Army, was courtmartialled for collaborating with the Japanese. He was acquitted by the Court, his defense being that he was forced to do so. It was a good omen for us.

August 4, 1945, Saturday

We read in the Free Philippines the speech of Pres. Osmeña on the occasion of the anniversary of the death of Pres. Quezon. Among other things, he said that “if Quezon had stayed in the Philippines, he would have preferred death rather than cooperate with the Japanese.” It was of course an attack against Roxas.

In the same issue, the paper praised Osmeña lavishly and stated that he was a worthy successor to Pres. Quezon. The Free Philippines is the official organ of the Army. It must reflect the policies and opinions of the Army. We supposed that as regards fundamental matters, MacArthur will have to be consulted. We interpret the editorial therefore as meaning that MacArthur and the Army support Osmeña. This is to be deeply regretted, not because we are against Osmeña, but because the Army should never meddle in politics. America took the necessary precautions to prevent rule by the Army. Army rule is always dictatorial. It is one of the evils that has cursed many nations. If MacArthur’s Army decidedly works for Osmeña, he will win. It is just too bad for Roxas.

July 23, 1945 Monday

The newspapers bring two pieces of news; one elated us, and the other alarmed us.

The first seems to indicate an early end of the war. United Press reports in New York that the United States government administration is taking steps to draft the United States unconditional surrender terms. New York Herald Tribune states that the possible terms as reported from reliable sources are the following: (1) Return of all territories seized by force; (2) Complete destruction of Japanese fleet and air force; (3) Dismantling of all shipbuilding facilities capable of turning out air crafts and munitions; (4) Japan will not be invaded, only a token “supervisory force” will be sent to Japan; (5) Japan is to retain her form of government, including the Emperor, and to manage her own political, economic and social affairs; and (6) Japan may be supplied with iron, coal, oil and other resources needed for civilian use.

Some parts of the above terms need clarification. For instance, what shall be done with Manchuria, Korea and Formosa?

If I were Japan, I would grab peace under the above terms. Japan is already beaten. With the hundreds of superfortresses, her annihilation or almost complete destruction is assured. Furthermore, due to her own fault, her dream of union among the countries of Greater East Asia has been blasted. Because of her record in these countries, it will take a century before her nationals will be welcomed in these countries. Not only did she disqualify herself to be the leader of any union to be organized here, but she will probably not even be admitted until she shows that she can treat other people as civilized people do. China may want to be the leader. If Manchuria and Formosa are returned to her, she will be the strongest nation in the world and may even dominate the world. The Chinese are not only good businessmen, but they have also shown themselves to be good soldiers. But they were also shown to be cruel at times. I believe that for the safety of the Orient, China be divided into at least three nations: North and South China, and Manchuria.

It is rumored that in Washington these terms for surrender were received with general approval.

The above news must be related to other news. It is reported that Russia is acting as intermediary and that Stalin took with him to Berlin the surrender terms, evidently to submit them to the Conference between him, Truman and Churchill. Another news item is that before the Russian delegation left for Berlin, the Japanese Ambassador Sato, had a conference with Foreign Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov and with the Vice-Commissar.

Something must be in the offing. All of us expect or at least hope that termination of the war will come.

Today, our stock prices have reached the highest level.

The alarming news is that the feud in Manila seems to be impossible to patch up. It is growing worse to the dismay and disappointment of the Filipino people.

Roxas is reported to have stated that the administration of Osmeña “smacks of dictatorship”. He reiterated his criticism of the elimination of judiciary officials, army men and civil service employees without following the processes provided by law for their separation. He also cites blunders being committed by the administration. “Take for instance eggs,” he said. “The price fixed is 3 centavos per egg, whereas the price at sources is 4 centavos. The hen will not even care to lay eggs.”

It should be remembered that the Committee on Appointments returned the appointment of the seven justices appointed by Osmeña. This is tantamount to disapproval. It was suggested that the Court of Appeals abolished by Osmeña be revived. Instead, Osmeña reappointed the seven justices in defiance of the apparent desire of the Committee.

The Senate of the United States Congress has approved the Bretton Woods monetary agreement, approved by representatives of 44 countries. The agreement provides for the establishment of an international bank with a capital of $9,100,000,000 to make or guarantee loans for rehabilitation and economic development. It also provides for a fund of $8,800,000,000 as monetary fund for stabilizing the currency exchange rate of participant countries. The participation of the United States will be $5,900,000,000 in the proposed $17,900,000,000, divided thus: $3,175,000,000 for bank’s capital and $2,750,000,000 for the exchange stabilization fund.

The approval of the agreement in the United States Congress seems certain.

This Agreement is of far-reaching effect. We must be a member of it. As one of the countries needing funds for rehabilitation, we should secure from the fund what we need for the purpose. The exchange question will also he vastly simplified. I suppose the bank will also act as a sort of clearing house.

July 20, 1945 Friday

At about ten o’clock this morning, we were advised that Col. Gilfilan, the Superintendent, wanted to see Mr. Paredes, Gen. Francisco and me. We all became very excited. We thought that we will receive some good news relating to our release. But I doubted this. Why should others, like Yulo and Alunan, whose cases are also very meritorious, not be included? On the other hand, I feared that I would be investigated. A few days ago, an Army Chaplain came with letters from Manila. I got the idea that one of those letters was for me. They were handed by the Chaplain to the Colonel. As they were uncensored, I feared that the letter for me may have contained something that would require further inquiry. But it turned out later that I had no letter. Those who were not invited by Col. Gilfilan looked at us with envy. We walked to the office of the Colonel where we saw our dear friend who had shown deep sympathy towards us, Colonel Barros. We immediately concluded that Col. Barros wanted to visit us and, for some reason, we were allowed to talk him at the Superintendent’s Office. Colonel Gilfilan was extremely nice to us. He motioned to Col. Barros that he could talk to us in the farthest corner of the room. We were with Col. Barros for about 20 minutes. He brought us some gifts. He said that he had been wanting to see us to be able to personally express his sympathy. He said that we must not be ashamed because almost all our countrymen are convinced that we had done absolutely nothing against our country and people, nothing that was even censurable. We asked the Colonel whether there was news about us. He answered no, except he considered the speech of Gen. MacArthur favorable to us in the sense that he urges unity among the Filipinos. He said that his wife cried when she heard that we were here as prisoners. He said that the people at the beginning were somewhat prejudicial against us, but now they understand and they even admire us. He reiterated his ardent desire that we be freed so that our country may again count with our services.

When we were about to leave, Col. Gilfilan beckoned us to sit around his table. He said that he was doing all he could to make us more comfortable. We expressed our gratitude.

Upon our arrival at the stockade, we told our companions to prepare their letters as we were leaving the next day. No one swallowed it.

All the newspapers report heavy bombardment of Japan by air and sea. One thousand five hundred super-fortresses and fighters from aircraft carriers had attacked different places in Japan. Air attack is almost continuous. The biggest task force ever assembled with several dreadnaughts are bombarding Japan from places about a rifle’s shot from the shores. We who trembled with just a few small planes bombarding, have a pretty good idea of the effects of such bombardment. We are now confident that the war will end soon. Although America has always insisted on unconditional surrender, there were statements from responsible persons in America that Emperor Hirohito will be spared and that the Japanese people will not be enslaved. Somebody jokingly remarked that Hirohito will go to the shrine, commune with his God-ancestors, and afterwards, say that he was requested by them to surrender. Recto remarked that the ancestors will mark, “Estamos cayados”.

I had expressed the belief before that the collaborationist issue may divide our people and confuse the political situation. Already in Manila there is a serious division on this account. But the injustice committed against us and the indifference toward our situation shown by even our most intimate friends in Manila, will compel us to organize a party of our own. This will be composed of the supposed collaborationists and their sympathizers. We will organize everyone here and found a newspaper. We will put up candidates for representatives and senators. We ourselves will run. We shall seek not only our vindication, but the carrying out of policies and programs which shall make our country truly independent and prosperous. With the elements this proposed party can count on, it will be a formidable one. If Osmeña and Roxas do not reconcile, the new party may even put up a candidate for president.

McNutt, ex-American High Commissioner of the Philippines and the father of the re-examinationist movement under which the Philippines will have more or less permanent political connection with America, is coming. Avowedly he comes to investigate economic conditions, but if that is the purpose, he is not exactly qualified. I am more inclined to believe that he comes to ascertain the chances his theory may have, and begin laying the groundwork to push his ideas through. We must be on guard. In the movement, he will be supported by American capitalists who see in the Philippines a good field for investment or a strategic place for commercial operations in the Orient, and the imperialists who dream world domination by America. We must assure the free rights of every people. We must combat imperialism at all cost.

What are we? Nobody seems to know. We came as war prisoners, but such status is inconsistent with the theory of those who wish to detain us. If the Republic had never existed and the Commonwealth continued, then we cannot be enemies and we cannot be war prisoners. If the existence of the Republic is recognized, we will then be enemies. At the beginning, the Superintendent here always mentioned the Geneva Convention as the source of all their authority. Later, we were told that we were merely under protective custody. We should appreciate their good intention, but is there real danger for us? Still later, we were told that we were modified or assimilated war prisoners. None of us understand this. Finally, two days ago, the Superintendent objected to our calling ourselves prisoners. “You are not prisoners. You are internees,” he said. It soothes us not to be branded as prisoners, but what matters is not the name but the situation.

Once in a while we crave for real Filipino food. We cannot help but get tired of canned American food which we are not accustomed to eat. Minister Sison and I decided to stay at our quarters to be able to eat such food. It was one of the best meals we have ever enjoyed. We ate good fish, mechado, and rice, with mango and banana dessert. It was a perfect meal. It made us homesick, especially since the mechado was from my wife sent to me from Manila.

We were given a suit of khaki, a two-piece American soldier’s uniform. It is made of good cloth. The coat fits me, but the pants have to be remade by tailor Hernandez from Ibaan Batangas. He is a good tailor.

July 17, 1945 Tuesday

It was reported that there was a plan to launch a team composed of Osmeña for President and Romulo for Vice President. It is also said that Romulo had declined. It is too bad. We wish Romulo were a candidate so that the people can show that they do not consider Romulo the hero he seems to think he is.

I cannot complain now of not receiving letters. After more than two months, I began to receive letters and they are coming quite frequently. It seems that mail facilities are improving. How I suffered for not hearing from my family. Now I can be happy. I know that my family lives in the house of Paddy, my son-in-law; that Lily, Paddy and Monching are taking care of them; that they are in good health (although my wife had been sick with malaria, now she is well and fast improving in health); that many friends of ours are remembering us, giving my family money, food and clothing; that they are amply provided for with everything. I am especially pleased because my son, Tony, is fully aware of our situation and he has been acting as a good father does. He tried to find work so he could earn money with which to support his mother, brother and sisters, but failing in this, he engaged in business, devoting his whole time and energy and ability to it. He is meeting with quite a success, earning more than enough to support my family. My wife and Tony are so optimistic that they think that by the time I return, they will have some money saved.

The only discordant note is that I heard the very sad news that among the victims of the Japanese are my brother-in-law Jose Lualhati (husband of my sister Conchita), their youngest child, and Nicanor Castillo, my nephew. What a cruel world! I doubly hate the Japanese for murders committed upon my family. Is it not a paradox that I am being imprisoned for being a pro-Japanese?

The papers report an interview with Pres. Laurel on January 22, 1944 by a prominent person whose identity is not disclosed. According to that interview, Laurel stated that he had no illusions about the reality of the independence granted by the Japanese; that he stayed in the Philippines because Pres. Quezon decided at the last hour to leave him here, believing that in view of his relations with the Japanese, he would be in a better position to protect our people; that he did not want to be president and the position was thrust upon him; that he did not blindly follow the Japanese as he protested what he thought constituted a violation of our rights as a supposed independent nation; and that he was very frank and outspoken in his dealings with the Japanese. Once he told Gen. Kuroda, the then Commander-in-Chief, that all the Japanese in the NARIC (later BIBA) were crooks. He admitted that the independence granted was a sham as there were the Japanese Army, Navy and the Japanese Ambassador to block his policies and his every move.

The interview created a good impression and, in so far as we are concerned, it gives a good idea of the difficult and perilous situation we found ourselves in.

July 16, 1945 Monday

No effort is being spared to prevent a break between Osmeña and Roxas and to preserve unity. It is said that a great majority of the Senators and Representatives signed a petition which they presented to Osmeña and Roxas urging reconciliation and unity. In this campaign, they were backed by other influential people outside the government.

Speaker Zulueta declared that a fight between Osmeña and Roxas is a remote possibility. Both are Nacionalistas and Roxas has not resigned from the party. He said that a Party Convention should be held. Both must submit to the convention and abide by the result of the convention. In theory, this is very good. But I fear that this is not what will happen. If passions run high, no convention will be able to prevent a fight.

What has been the reaction? The people are decidedly behind the movement. Osmeña, to the surprise of everybody, expressed conformity, but at the same time announced his candidacy. I could hardly believe this. It shows thoughtful political strategy. I wonder who are advising him on political affairs. He gave up and did certain things, however, which might have paved the way to reconciliation.

For instance, instead of making an issue of his appointment of the three notorious Cabinet secretaries by raising the argument that the positions are more or less confidential and a matter of confidence, knowing that members of Congress were strongly against it, he withdrew the appointments, an action which had no precedent. There was no mental reservation that he would reappoint them after adjournment, as other executives have done in the past. No kind of effort at all was made toward face-saving. In the past, the appointments are confirmed and after a little while, some apparently good or plausible reasons are invented for the withdrawal from office of the appointee.

And what was the attitude of the appointees? To say the least, it was shameful. They were not man and courageous enough to face the truth. Do they think that there was even a handful of men who believed that they could do much in the Rehabilitation Committee? It is believed that they would spoil the whole effort in America. In the case of Kalaw, what a shame — from Cabinet member to book-collector, a ₱100.00 clerk work! And there was no sign of indignation on the part of these men. It also is not a credit to the appointing official. And all these are at the expense of prostrated Juan de la Cruz. Getting ₱1000 a month for “vacation work”. And these are the patriots who will give their lives for Juan de la Cruz? Poor Philippines!

Oh, I almost forgot the other good action of Osmeña. Showing a spirit of revenge, Confesor announced that while in the U.S. he would expose Roxas who he had been attacking violently. He especially ridiculed the claim that Roxas was the head of the underground resistance in the Philippines. Osmeña was forced to admonish Confesor publicly. He enjoined Confesor to devote his time to the work of the Committee. As to Roxas, a ray of hope arose when it was published that he had ordered the cessation of the campiagn for his candidacy. There was jubilation as it was interpreted to mean that an understanding had been reached. Almost immediately thereafter, however, the papers reported a speech made by Roxas before a guerrilla group attacking the administration of Osmeña. In substance, Roxas said that the administration has not done anything, has absolutely no idea of what should be done to rehabilitate the wrecked finances of the government and to solve the food shortage and other grave problems of the country. It was a bitter denunciation.

Such is the present situation. The fight is not a remote possibility as claimed by Speaker Zulueta, but it is now a reality. Only a miracle can save our country from what all consider a national cataclysm.

I forgot something else also in this connection. It was reported that Roxas told the Senators and Representatives that he would be for unity if the following conditions are accepted: (1) reinstatement of all officials elected in 1940; (2) reinstatement of all employees in the civil service; (3) reistatement of justices and all judicial officers; (4) reinstatement of officers in the Army; (5) more effective rehabilitation measures; and (6) redemption of all Philippine National Bank notes. At first Roxas denied the news; it seems, however, that the report is absolutely true. It is also reported that Osmeña is inclined to accept Roxas’ conditions. This is humiliating since it is an admission of the failure of his administration. But he had sacrificed his personal ambition more than once before, even what others would call dignity, for the sake of his country.

As a matter of fact, unity is not impossible to attain, but the root cause of disunity must be eliminated. To me, it all arises out of this foolish “collaboration issue”. If there were no such issue, there would been no reinstatement problem of employees, judicial officers, elective officials, and Army officers because all these people are being deprived of their respective offices due to this meaningless collaboration issue. As to rehabilitation, there could be no issue about it, and as to bank notes, there should not be much disagreement. Now that the Japanese have been driven away, all were agreed that 99-1/2 percent of the Filipinos were against them. There is practically no Filipino today who does not mourn the death of a near relative or who has not been the victim of Japanese cruelty and brutality. I would say even the most pro-Japanese changed. Everyone we talked to wanted a crack at the Japanese. My own son was insisting in joining the Army because he imagined hearing always the pitiful cries of his dear sister Neny. Some people in government have made it appear there were countless “pro-Japanese Filipinos”. We thought they could be counted with the fingers of our hands. But it turns out, to our surprise, that we were all wrong because they ran to several thousands. It is driving us to desperation. It is root cause of this destructive evil of disunity. A revelation was opened to us.

Even MacArthur was alarmed with what was happening, and he earnestly counseled unity for the sake of the independence of our country and welfare of our people. I know be loves our country and I have no doubt that his only purpose is to help our country. But I fear that for reasons on which many theories have been advanced, he is not aware of the fact that, more than anybody else, he is responsible for this situation. What a disappointment!

The Americans themselves are becoming aware of our anomalous situation. They do not seem to know what to call us. At first, they said that they merely took us under protective custody to protect us from infuriated people. If so, are all measures being taken necessary for the purpose? Was it necessary to leave us exposed to the sun for 2 days in a place (Pier 4 in North Harbor) where there were no persons, except soldiers and Army employees, that could harm us? Was it necessary to herd us like cattle in a dark and hot hold of a ship with a small exit door securely guarded? Was it necessary not to allow us on deck except for only an hour everyday? Do they mean to say that our lives were in danger while sailing in the deep China Sea with only American crewmen? Was it necessary to confine us in a small well-guarded place within a colony in a government reservation? They confined us with those who were real spies of the Japanese and who had been responsible for the death of Filipinos. These are the people whose lives are in danger and are in need of protection. Instead of getting justice and liberty, we landed in jail here in Iwahig wihout knowing what it was all about, there to be treated worse than the worst criminals — the convicted criminals could roam around the Colony, talk to the people, and eat what is good for them; whereas we are detained in a stockade of less than one hectare in size surrounded by barbed wires. Here we are held incommunicado, compelled to eat food that we detest, ordered to be neat but not allowed to send clothes outside to be laundered nor given facilities for laundering inside the stockade; humiliated by marching us like ordinary prisoners to the mess near the plaza with guards carrying sub-machines guns; prohibited to smoke on the way and to talk to each other; deprived of our liberty without the semblance of a trial which we thought is guaranteed to free people by the Constitution and the tradition of America.

We have not injured anybody; one the contrary; we did our best to save and protect the people. Even the guerrillas can have no motive for complaint. All we did was to advise them to lie low while the Americans were not yet here since we were absolutely defenseless. For each Japanese killed, houses were burned, hundreds of Filipinos killed, and we just could do nothing about it.

There seems to be a movement in Manila to postpone the election. Speaker Zulueta seems to be decidedly for postponement, giving his reason that peace and order throughout the Philippines is such that it is not yet possible to hold elections. Of course postponement of an election is really undemocratic, but if elections are not advisable under the circumstances, there should be no hesitation to postpone. Personally, I believe it should be postponed. It will facilitate the efforts for understanding and unity.

It is reported that there are two blocs in the Senate: one pro-Osmeña and the other pro-Roxas. The pro-Osmeña senators are reported to be Rodriguez, Rama, Garcia, Torres, Sa Ramain, Martinez and Bondoc. It is very regrettable to have such blocs in the Senate.

* * * * *

The war in the Philippines has just been declared officially terminated. This, of course, does not mean that there will be no more fighting in the Philippines. Many Japanese soldiers have retreated to the mountains. I suppose the Filipino guerrillas will take care of cleaning them up. I believe over half a million Filipinos have died on account of the war. I am afraid Filipinos will continue dying. Mutual congratulations were passed around. Osmeña made the statement that now we can return to constitutional civil administration. Undoubtedly, this is an answer to the charge launched by Roxas that constitutional guarantees are being disregarded. It was thought that because of the termination of the war in the Philippines, we can now be released. Evidently though, “during the duration” is being interpreted to mean while the war in the whole Orient has not been declared terminated.

Many speculations have been made as to when the war will end. Some say that because of the reconquest of the Philippines it will terminate soon. My opinion is that it will all depend upon the circumstances. In case peace negotiations are started, war will end tomorrow. Japan knows that she is licked. It is all a question of time. If she persists, she knows that all her cities will be wiped out and millions of her people will die. She is only interested in face saving. Even if the words “unconditional surrender” are not used, she would be willing to give up all that she would lose under an “unconditional surrender”.

Continuation of the war will also mean, of course, the sacrifice of lives of Americans and the expenditure of huge amounts of money although these would be very small in comparison to what the Japanese stand to lose. Some Americans, like Sen. Capeheart, are inclined to favor a negotiated peace. They are willing to consider peace overtures which he assures have already been made. But it seems that Pres. Truman and other Allied high officials insist in an unconditional surrender. Nobody of course knows, but Japan may be able to hold out for some time yet. More than a year ago, they knew that the Americans and the British will be able to attack her by air, land and sea. She must have been preparing for it. Furthermore, Japan is very mountainous, the type of terrain appropriate for their way of fighting. The strategy of the United Nations seems to be to break the morale of the Japanese and to destroy the Japanese faith in the divinity of their Emperor. It will not be so easy to destroy a system which has been observed for many centuries. This may take some time and in the meanwhile, the Japanese may continue fighting. I hope Japan’s surrender will be very soon.

Pessimism again reigns in the stockade. Our feeling has never been as low as it is today. Our impression is that we are being forgotten. What must be happening? It looks like the war may drag on for some time and, in the meantime, we have to make the most of our confinement.

July 14, 1945 Saturday

I am naturally very interested in the former employees of the government. It seems that the administration has considered all former employees as collaborators and as such they were all dropped from the service. Osmeña has somewhat qualified this policy and a few, like the teachers, have been reinstated. But the great majority are still out of public service. Many of them are now suffering, the victims of the injustices of politics. I say injustice because they have been replaced by henchmen of the government moguls. I hope they will be reinstated immediately. My reasons may be seen below.

When the Commission organized the government on Jan. 21, 1942, there was practically no government employee that wanted to reenter the service. But the government had to run and we did our best to persuage them to accept employment. They told us that they preferred to wait because the Americans would be back in less than a year. Anyhow, they said they had already received their three months’ salary. At the beginning, I was rather doubtful myself as rumors were very strong that an American Army and Navy Convoy were already on the way. But days passed, weeks and months passed, and no help was in sight, and in the meanwhile resistance in Corregidor and Bataan was weakening.

The fall of Corregidor and Bataan was imminent — there was no indication that the Americans were coming soon. The employees held out as long as they could. But after they had spent their three months’ salary, most of them could not longer continue without employment. They were now drawing from the little savings they had. As everybody knows, unless a government employee is dishonest, he cannot possibly provide for the morrow. This the reason why I am now convinced that the insurance system of protection for the employees must be converted into a regular pension system. The insurance is just a temporary help; the pension is permanent and provides for the employee when he loses his job, or for his family after his death. With the pension plan we can retire old employees, and the employees will do their best to maintain an efficient record during the period necessary to entitle them to receive the pension. They will be honest as they know that if they become incapacitated or die, they can rest assured that their families will not live in misery.

Going back to the government employees, a few of them engaged in business; but a great majority of them had to work and they were not fit to do anything else. They had to choose between employment or starvation. It is easy to say that for patriotic reasons, he should have preferred to starve and to suffer. But when his innocent little children began to clamor for food, they had to be fed — no explanation could sooth them. What was the poor father supposed to do? He could go around borrowing money or asking help from his friends. His friends may be very accommodating, but this could not continue for a long time because they also are not enjoying abundance. He looks for a job outside the government or any work which had nothing to do with the Japanese. The only pair of shoes that he still has wears out and he has spent his last money. What could he do? He could not go to the mountains leaving his family to starve under the mercy of the Japanese. He did not want to steal for he is a religious and perfectly honest man. What did he do? He went to the office where he had spent the best years of his life. He went there out of necessity; to live, to save his beloved wife and children. He served without the least intention of helping the Japanese since, having been reared in an atmosphere of justice and freedom, he could not possibly ally himself with men for whom such justice and freedom were a mockery. His whole thought, his sole aim was to save his family. Even then, there were many who resisted.

I remember vividly one case and fortunately he is here with us because if I am wrong, he could correct me. I am referring to Mr. Pimentel, our Secretary. I met him one day (during the war) and asked him what he was doing. He said he was not doing anything and, although he was already in dire straits, he would prefer not to work with or under the Japanese. His information was that in six months, the Americans would be back. He said that he had sons in the USAFFE and he did not care to be in any way connected with the Japanese. I knew Mr. Pimentel as a man who was as poor as myself and that he had to work all the time to support his big family. When we parted, I saw the determination in his eyes to continue fighting the Japanese in his own way.

But Bataan and Corregidor were crumbling; they fell shortly. He became convinced that the Americans could not come back in one year. He could not hold out that long so he decided to accept employment. Pimentel’s experience is the same as that of thousands and thousands of government employees — by necessity they accepted employment. In their hearts they did not for a moment waiver in their ardent desire to see the Americans back in the Philippines. They could not give any outward manifestation of their sentiments, as the offices were full of spies and the movements of officials and employees were watched closely. But inside their homes, among their immediate family, they prayed fervently for the victory of America. But many did not stop there. When the guerrillas became numerous and active, most of them joined the guerrillas in one form or another. I say in one form or another because, although there were many who were given official ranks, there were also many who did not want any appointment or sign anything for fear that they would be discovered. After all, they said, the important thing was to render service to the cause of America and the Philippines. No official papers or signatures could be more valuable than that. Like true heroes, real patriots, the material gain never entered their minds.

How did they serve the cause of America and the Philippines? They served by furnishing valuable information, helping in every way those active in the guerrilla warfare, bolstering up the morale of our people, creating difficulties for the Japanese Army and Navy and the Japanese in general. These employees were the anonymous forces that helped. Their services were equally meritorious.

To cite an instance of how they served. Ironically, this involved Mr. Confesor who seems to have had something to do with the formation of the present government’s policy involving former employees. Sometime in 1943, evidently as an answer to the appeal of Gov. Caram of Iloilo, Mr. Confesor wrote him a letter giving his reasons why he did not care to come down from the mountains and surrender to the Japanese. I was able to get a copy of the letter. It was a well written letter and his arguments were very weighty. It impressed me very deeply so much so that as I had always considered him a close friend of mine, I wanted to discuss the matter with him. Unfortunately I was not able to see him. I said that it was a good letter, but it contained an insinuation against which I must protest. I lost my two copies during the fire in my house and in my office. But I distinctly remember that there was a paragraph or some sentences referring to some speeches we delivered in Iloilo (in March or April of 1943), which in substance say the following: “You better prepare new speeches which you can deliver next July when the Americans will be here.” The insinuations were that (a) we were mere job-seekers; and (b) we were so insincere that we only say what would be pleasing to the ears of our hearers. This is not the proper place to answer such scurrilous accusations. For the present, I must make it of record that I have never been a job-seeker, and that I have always considered insincerity as one of the worst traits a man can possess.

Well, I brought Mr. Confesor’s letter to Manila and placed it in my desk drawer at the office, together with many other important documents. Many employees had heard about the famous letter announcing the coming of the Americans and they were all anxious to get a copy. One day, a clerk of mine entered my office gasping. “What’s the matter,” I asked him. “Sir, they are distributing copies of Mr. Confesor’s letter,” he stammered. I was alarmed; everybody knew what was coming if the Japanese ever found out that a prescripted document like that letter was being copied and distributed in our office. It would have meant Fort Santiago for all of us and at that time the mere mention of that historic fort made everybody shudder. I investigated the matter and I discovered that, as I had just come from Iloilo and suspecting that I had a copy of the letter, my employees went through my drawers and found the copy. They made numerous copies using the typewriter in our office. Each and every one of them became a distributor of the letter and a propagandist of the coming of the Americans. I had to take unusual precautions to cover up that happening in my office. I understand similar incidents occurred in the other offices.

Another evidence of the employees’ pro-American feelings. About 20 employees of an important bureau of the government were arrested by the “Kempetai” (Japanese Military Police). They were charged with being guerrillas and according to the Kempetai, the evidence consisted of a list of “guerrilleros” which they found. The matter was brought up to Malacañan. Naturally a promise was made to the Japanese that the matter would be investigated and proper criminal and administrative action would be taken against the guilty parties. All except the three supposed leaders, were released. I do not know what happened to those leaders, but they were probably released after the usual torture meted out to almost all those arrested.

During the investigation it was discovered that if the guerrilla elements in all the bureaus were to be eliminated, there would have been almost complete paralization of the government. The whole matter was hushed and covered up. I do not recall anyone prosecuted or dismissed from the service for guerrilla activities or connections.

More evidence of the attitude of the employees. Everytime there was a meeting or a parade, attendance had to be obligatory under heavy administrative penalty, otherwise very few attended. The employees offered all kinds of excuses to avoid going to the parade or meeting.

In this connection, I would like to say something about the ex-officers and servicemen of the USAFFE. At the beginning, we were not sure what the attitude of the Japanese to their employment would be. Already we could observe that a good many of them were suffering for lack of means. We were able to convince the Japanese to allow us to employ these men. The argument we used, which we knew could never be true, was that these men sincerely wanted to be with the Japanese because they were beginning to understand that Orientals ought to be together. We devoted much attention to them. We issued orders reinstating them to their old positions and, as to the others who were not former government employees, we ordered that preference in hiring be given to them. I can certify that inspite of all the hardships these men were going through, very few took advantage of our orders. Only those who would otherwise starve unless they earned something accepted positions in the government.

Another fact that should be considered. In the last months of the Japanese regime, in view of the dangers in Manila, the food shortage, the financial condition of the government and the paralization of government activities, orders were issued for the release of the employees with payment of a certain amount of bonus. Everybody wanted to take advantage of it. If we had not rescinded our orders there would have been practically nobody left.

There are the men that are now being punished. They are patriots in their own way. Perhaps their services were even more effective than those who now wish to monopolize patriotism. The only thing they were guilty of was that they wished to live, and managed to live. And because they survived the war, they are now branded as traitors; because they were unable and could not possibly go to the mountains, they are being placed on a worst ration than bread and water.

It is said that something is being done — but the process is entirely wrong. A board of inquiry has been appointed to determine whether those seeking reinstatement could be allowed to return. My opinion is that they should all be reinstated and then the Board can determine whether they could or should continue or not. The difference is that in the first case, the employees are being presumed guilty and the burden of proving the contrary is thrown upon them. In the latter case, they are presumed innocent and they could remain in the service as long as nothing has been proven against them.

Justice is all that I demand for them.

July 11, 1945 Wednesday

Confesor, Cabili and Kalaw are out of the Cabinet. Their appointments would have been disapproved in the Commission on Appointments anyway, for justifiable reasons. The three are temperamentally unfit for such high positions. They are not only unprepared for such important responsibility but their prestige among the people is very low. They have done a great dishonor to our country in that they have done the most to divide us with their blind and indiscriminating prejudice against those who held any kind of position in the former regime. According to them, all those people are traitors to their country; that the only patriots are those who ran to the mountains and stayed there, those who issued emergency notes Like Confesor and Kalaw, or who did not join the government because the “buy and sell” business was more profitable. The Commission would have disapproved the appointments of the three with a full and public exposition of the reasons. Osmeña sensed trouble brewing. He immediately withdrew the appointments of Confesor anc Cabili, and appointed them to the Rehabilitation Commission in the U.S. Kalaw was made a book collector in the U.S.A. These are strictly political appointments. What can Confesor and Cabili do? Instead of helping they will prejudice the mission entrusted to the Rehabilitation Commission since that requires not only ability, but above all tact, moderation, and subtleties of diplomacy. These two men absolutely lack these qualities. As to Kalaw, isn’t it degrading that an ex-member of the Cabinet will merely be a book collector, a work that any instructor in a University can do? The worst part of it is that poor Juan de la Cruz is always the victim. The three men must be getting the salary of a Cabinet Member in addition to per diems and many other allowances of officials detailed abroad. How can we convince the people that we have the welfare of our country at heart?

Such action is weakening Pres. Osmeña. It may cost him the presidency. The general remark is that he is not using his appointing power judiciously.

It is also suggested that debts incurred during the Japanese occupation be revalued as of the date the debt was incurred. I think this is also a private matter which should be left to the courts. Furthermore, in almost all cases, the estimated value of the military note in the future had already been taken into consideration. I know for instance of a ₱100,000 indebtedness for which the debtor will pay only ₱5,000, but in Philippine currency at the time payment.

It seems that some banks refused to admit as security all real estate acquired during the Japanese occupation. This is a wrong attitude. If the owner has a Torrens Title, that should be enough for any bank to grant credit. If the guarantee is sufficient, the bank will not lose anything having acquired interest in good faith. But again this is a matter that should be left to the courts to decide. The buyer in good faith must be protected; on the other hand, sellers in bad faith must not be allowed to take advantage. The Chamber of Commerce has asked for a definition of the policy stating that unless this is settled rehabilitation would be difficult. The Chamber is right, since the amount of real estate transactions during the Japanese occupation was enormous.

Many more questions like this will arise in view of the decision of Judge Dizon that all court proceedings during the occupation are invalid. These cases should be appealed to the Supreme Court for final ruling. It is of transcendental importance. The Judge himself was aware of it as he suggested that an act of Congress validate such proceedings.

July 9, 1945 Monday

I notice in the papers that many questions are arising as a result of the Japanese occupation. Some of them are the following: (1) Bank deposits during the Japanese regime; (2) Japanese military notes (“Mickey Mouse” money); (3) Real estate transactions during said regime.

All deposits during the Japanese regime have nullified. This is of course a necessary consequence of the fact that the Japanese military notes have been declared worthless. Such action for the present is entirely justified. If bank deposits during the Japanese regime are recognized, no bank will be able to open. They will have to be declared bankrupt unless the government assumes responsibility for such deposits, which is of course impossible. The military notes, of course, have to be declared worthless because there is no reason for them and they were issued by the enemy. The United States and Philippine governments cannot be made responsible for them. They have to be outlawed. These military notes are not really money or currency. They were really only a means of requisitioning Filipino materials. It was the equivalent of the Japanese confiscating the food and other materials belonging to the Filipinos without compensation. But at the same time, the Japanese, by order, declared them legal tender — refusal to accept was considered a hostile act punishable with a heavy penalty. We therefore, against our will, had to recognize them as legal currency. They were used in all transactions. In the meanwhile, the circulation of Philippine Commonwealth money was strictly prohibited. Anybody circulating them or even possessing them was arrested and punished. The Japanese had spies to detect those violating the prohibition.

I do not believe though that the so-called Mickey Mouse money problem is permanently dead. I think after the war, discussion of that subject would have to ensue. The Japanese have circulated here over a billion. Where are they? The rich, the influential, the intelligent do not have them. As they knew what would become of those notes, they disposed of all that they had. So where did they go? They must have gone somewhere since they were not destroyed. I suspect that they went to the masses — to the laborers, small merchants, producers and vendors especially the small ones like those who produced and sold “camote”, “casava”, vegetables, etc. They must possess quite a big amount. They worked hard for their money. When normalcy is resumed, they will demand that the notes be recognized or be given some value. I do not believe they will stop their demand until they get something. I believe they will get something. Even now in Congress, a resolution was introduced to register this kind of money and try to get payment from Japan. I am sure it will be taken up in the peace conference. I suggest that proceeds from the sale of Japanese properties and holdings be applied to the payment of these military notes. After the war, Japan will not be in a position to pay. So I believe that the United States Government or the Philippine Government will pay even a small portion. There is a precedent for this. Belgium was in the same situation as the Philippines after the First World War, although the German marks circulated in Belgium went down in value and afterwards became worthless. The Belgium government assumed responsibility and paid a portion of those marks at a rate which I do not remember just now.

However, in recognizing these military notes in whole or in part, the necessary economic measures must be taken to avoid inflation. The release of such a big amount necessarily will cause inflation. Furthermore, the government cannot afford to pay at one time and if it has to borrow money, it will need also a big amount for amortization and interest. What should be done is to make an accurate and scientific readjustment in the circulation. Nobody knows how much Japanese military notes have been circulated in the Philippines. Notwithstanding all my efforts, I could not ascertain it. I believe, however, it is not as much as I originally thought. The military notes circulated only in Manila and some provinces in Luzon. In the South, with the exception of Davao and inside the cities of Cebu, Iloilo and Bacolod, they did not circulate at all. A good portion of those notes had been destroyed. My estimate now is that there is only over a billion. The way to find out is to have them registered. Supposing it is one billion, I would pay immediately 5% or about ₱50,000,000. The rest or ₱950,000,000 I would divide into 40 parts each part to be paid in installments every year. Each installment would be ₱23,750,000. I believe that this amount can be absorbed by the natural increase in our production. This is just an example. The installments may be paid every five years if so desired. There should be three provisions: (1) That the periods may be shortened, if the finances of the government and the development of production — agriculture, industry and commerce — so warrant; (2) That the bonds are negotiable; and (3) That if the finances of the government so permit, the bonds may be redeemed sooner at a discount the amount of which shall depend upon the maturity of the bond. In other words, if for instance, a bond will mature in 30 years, after a period of five years the government may purchase them if offered by the holders at 25% or 50% of the face value of the bonds as may be decided upon.

But I say this must be considered after the complete termination of the war. While the war is still going on, it is natural that the Japanese money be declared worthless. One advantage of the postponement is that, if we get anything from Japan by way of an indemnity or by confiscation of their holdings in the Philippines, such amount will eliminate or at least lighten the burden that may be imposed the government.

Another point is, if we declare the Japanese notes worthless forever, it may relieve Japan from the obligation of providing for them as part of the indemnity.

It is reported that Pres. Osmeña sent a message to Congress recommending a solution to the problem of indebtedness incurred before the war paid during the Japanese occupation. The recommendation of his advisers, as I remember it, is the following: (1) Declare all payments invalid; (2) Declare all payments valid; (3) Revalue the payment made in accordance with the rate of exchange between the Philippine peso and the military note at the time of the payment. I do not understand why the government should meddle in a strictly private affair as this one. Furthermore, I doubt whether payments made could legally be declared illegal. It will be an epso facto law. As to the revaluation, this will involve many complications. Everything may as well be left for the courts to decide.

July 6, 1945 Friday

Yulo continued to be very bitter against everybody. He has lost confidence in Osmeña and in Roxas in so far as our situation is concerned. As to MacArthur, he says MacArthur will do only what would be for his own convenience. He thinks Osmeña is useless. As to Roxas, he resented the fact that both of them journeyed from Baguio to La Union together, and then to Manila together, and afterwards, Roxas left him. Since then, they have not seen each other.

It is reported that Osmeña at one time planned to prevent the election of Roxas as President of the Senate. He wanted Yulo to return to make him his candidate for the position. This was never carried out.

It was also reported that Roxas had said that Congress had nothing to do and could do nothing in our case, and that it is only the military that could decide our case. This report depressed us. But the news was clarified by the letter of my wife. She said that she, accompanied by Mrs. Recto and Sen. Rodriguez, went to see Pres. Osmeña in his office. The President received them amiably. My wife went there to intervene in my behalf. The President told them that he cannot do anything now as we are still under the military, that he had already requested that we be transferred to the Commonwealth, and that once transferred he would be able to do something. According to her, Roxas paid her a call at our house. He said practically the same thing — that nothing can be done now, but that he has already asked Gen. MacArthur to turn us over to the Commonwealth. He would do his best for us, and if necessary he will go to America.

Today, news came that the military campaign in the Philippines had been declared closed. This may accelerate our transfer to the Commonwealth.

* * * * *

It seems almost definite that the elections will be held next November and that the opposing candidates will be Pres. Osmeña and Roxas. There is quite a difference of opinion as to whether it will benefit us or prejudice us. The general opinion seems to be that it will favor us. Recto upholds this view. They say that both will try to do everything for us with the expectation that we would help whoever could get us released. They are aware that we here hold the balance of power and that whoever we support will come out.

My opinion is different. I believe the effect will be just the reverse. Each would not be a candidate unless he is reasonably sure that he can win. They would be thinking: Why allow a new element to come in which may deprive him of his chance to win? Better eliminate any disturbing element. On the other hand, there are many candidates for senator who will try to use their influence not to allow us to be released for fear that we may present our candidacies and therefore lessen their chances to get elected. Furthermore, each candidate will want to be sure of our support. Those will not get our support will surely work against us.

Both Osmeña and Roxas can do very much for us either way. Osmeña will be the one to decide what to do with us once we are turned over to the Commonwealth. On the other hand, Roxas is an intimate friend of MacArthur and just now our fate is in the hands of MacArthur. If, on the other hand, because of our prudence and because we do not want our attitude known just yet, both may lose interest or may want us to remain where we are until they find out how we stand.

We have been informed that the most serious charge against former Ministers of the Philippine Republic is that we left Manila and this resulted in the killing of so many residents of the city. In other words, they say that if we had not left Manila, the massacre of residents would not have occurred. I am sure that our presence in Manila would not have made any difference. This is what the Japanese did throughout China before the establishment of the Pro-Japanese government. The Japanese were aware that the majority of Filipinos were against them. To protect our people and ourselves, we of course denied this. But as a matter of fact, we knew positively that 95% of the Filipino people were anti-Japanese. We knew that even the government employees serving in the Japanese regime were “guerrilleros”. We knew the feeling of the Filipinos because we were in continuous close contact with them. They hated the Japanese. This feeling was prompted by the abuses committed by the Japanese. They also resented the intervention of the military police and Japanese civilians in strictly private affairs.

What the Filipinos resented most was the air of superiority assumed by the Japanese. Even those holding the lowliest jobs acted no more, no less than kings. All branches of government had Japanese advisers, some of them very ignorant. They would give orders to Filipino officials who by education and experience were far ahead of them.

I remember the case of Dr. Sison, Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dean of the College of Medicine, reputed as one of the best doctors in the Philippines. A young doctor in the Japanese Army with the rank of Lieutenant, a Dr. Ono, tried to boss him around. We had a Japanese friend, Mr. Yamamoto, then Manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank. We were with him almost everyday as he was a member of the Philippine Club and we used to play tennis with him. After the Japanese occupation of Manila, he would not even talk to us.

We interpreted the attitude of the Japanese as a superiority complex. This we can never accept. Just as we have been preaching that we must have no inferiority complex towards the Americans and other whites, we cannot under any circumstances admit inferiority to the Japanese. Such is the general feeling of Filipinos toward the Japanese and they knew this perfectly well. This is the reason why they tried to change the government, why they wanted Gen. Ricarte and Benigno Ramos to hold responsible positions in the government; why they organized the Makapili, which constitutes not only an army to fight with the Japanese, but a party openly and aggressively for the Japanese. They were against the Laurel government because they were convinced that all of us were not sincere. On the other hand, they knew perfectly well that in Manila and everywhere else, there were many “guerrilleros” and that the moment the Americans approached Manila the Filipinos would all rise up in arms. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that they had decided to kill everybody they saw before retreating. We could not have done anything. All that would have happened is that they would have killed us also; they did not discriminate. Even those who were reputed to be pro-Japanese and who had done much for the Japanese were killed.

Supposing that we could have done something, why did we leave Manila. We did not want to leave Manila. Plans to evacuate Manila had been previously considered. Various places were considered for the purpose, like San Mateo and Montalban. After due consideration, however, we decided to drop the matter of the proposed evacuation. But on the 19th of December, the President called us to a special meeting and told us that we were being ordered by the Japanese Military authorities to go to Baguio. We were all surprised. Baguio was one of the evacuation places considered and there was almost a unanimous vote against it for two reasons: (1) There were only two roads leading to the City. If these were cut off, not only would it be impossible to escape but there would also be a food shortage since Baguio is far from being self-sufficient. (2) The water supply of Baguio comes from a pumping water system and if the water lines or the pumping mechanism were destroyed or ran out of fuel, we would have a big problem with our water supply.

At any rate, we had decided not to leave Manila. We asked the President whether we could stay. He answered that he had done all he could to prevent the evacuation since he felt duty was to stay in Manila. He feared that there would be a panic when the people found out that the national government had left. He desired to be in a position to protect the people, to die if necessary. Of course that was also the sentiment of each and every Minister. The President said we must go.

We were given 48 hours to leave Manila. For this reason, I was not able to clear out my desk. My family had no time to prepare for departure. I left many things that I should have taken. At home, we packed hurriedly, also leaving many valuable things behind. We were not able to make arrangements for the occupancy of our house during our absence. We had to ask my daughter Lily and her husband to stay there in the meanwhile. The newly married couple, my daughter Neny and Ramon Cojuangco, could not go to Baguio with us because the younger sister of Ramon was doing to be married in a few days. They promised to follow us as soon as possible. (They failed to do so and I suspect it was because of lack of transportation or because American planes were hovering all over Luzon and it was not safe to travel.)

Our car was not ready for the long trip; it needed to be brought to the repair shop. We were told that we would leave for Baguio at ten o’clock of the night of the 20th. Our car was finished at about 9 o’clock of the night set for our departure, but it did not run smoothly. A Malacañan mechanic, after inspecting it, told us that the car could definitely not reach Baguio. I decided to take the armored car of the Philippine National Bank where I was the one-man Board of Directors. But the armored car was hardly sufficient to accommodate our cook, laundry woman and servants, not to mention our luggage. Not including our household help, we were thirteen: my wife and I, my eight children, mother-in-law, my Japanese military police guard and my chauffeur. We tried to get other cars in Malacañan, but they were all in bad shape and the mechanic certified that they could not reach Baguio. In a way, we were glad as we thought that it would be a good excuse for us not to go.

The Japanese offered to give us a military car, but of course I did not want to use such a car because it was painted in the special khaki color of all military cars. It would have been very dangerous since American planes seem to have already mastery of the air and I was sure that we would encounter American planes. The military car would be a target. I decided to borrow the Buick 7-passenger car of my son-in-law, Ramon Cojuangco (1941 model), although it had not been used for months and we were not sure that it would run. When we tried to leave the Malacañan Palace grounds to go to the house of Speaker Benigno Aquino where the car was kept, the Japanese guards stopped us and questioned us repeatedly. When they found out who I was and where I was going, and that my sole purpose for leaving the premises was to get my son-in-law’s car to use in going to Baguio, we were allowed to leave but under guard. Speaker Aquino’s house was within hailing distance from Malacañan.

The Buick would not start. We pushed it to start the engine, and finally after two hours of pushing, the car began to function. All the while we were pushing the automobile, the soldiers followed behind us. Back in Malacañan, the mechanic certified that it could reach Baguio, so we decided to use it.

We arrived in Malacañan before ten o’clock, the time for departure set by the military, but we were not to leave for Baguio until the next morning. No one was allowed to leave Malacañan. That night we slept on divans and chairs, and some slept in the cars. We were not allowed to get food from the outside; we had to be contented with the little food furnished us by Malacañan. The palace was very heavily guarded by Japanese soldiers and officers.

The motorcade consisted of at least 30 cars belonging to the President, the Chief Justice, and all the Ministers with the exception of Minister Sison of Home Affairs. The Japanese Ambassador and his staff were also with us. Alongside the car of each Minister was a military vehicle with Japanese guards in full uniform. We noticed that they kept their eyes on us.

We boarded our automobiles at about seven o’clock in the morning. We were given instructions. The cars were camouflaged and divided into groups. Each group would leave at half-hour intervals and each car was to keep a certain distance from the next. When American planes appeared, we were told to alight and endeavor to find an air raid shelter, or go to a more protected place like under trees, and not to move. We knew that the trip was going to be a dangerous one. I was worried as I was carrying about ₱15,000,000 of military notes and about ₱1,000,000 of Commonwealth notes in the armored car owned by the Philippine National Bank which was part of our caravan.

We did not actually start until about 9 o’clock and so we were inside the car sweating for a full two hours. The Kempetai or military police assigned to me sat with the chauffeur and was fully armed. We took the regular route to Baguio. There was very little civilian traffic or Filipinos on the road. All along the way, the roads with the exception of places inside the “poblacion” were deserted. Almost all the houses were vacant. The atmosphere was very pitiful and sombre. We also saw no animals. There were stretches of miles and miles with no Filipinos in sight. They probably had fled to the mountains or to the barrios to avoid the Japanese soldiers who had been taking all their food. There were many Japanese soldiers, automobiles, trucks and other military vehicles all along the way. It convinced us that there were still many Japanese soldiers in the Philippines. What we could not understand was that the soldiers were travelling in both directions. We saw cannons, especially anti-aircraft. We saw various airplanes parked alongside the roads, very well camouflaged.

Before leaving Manila, we were told that signals would be given whenever there was an air raid or American planes above. I forgot to say that our convoy included many trucks of Japanese officers and soldiers. Generally, there was one truck in front of a group and another behind. Because of these trucks, we travelled at a very slow pace. A kilometer before reaching San Fernando, Pampanga, we were stopped. We were advised that Camp Clark, the most important Japanese air base, was being attacked. We got off to run for shelter. I selected a ditch. We saw two American planes overhead. We certainly were scared. Evidently the planes did not see our cars as they continued on their way.

We proceeded on our way. San Fernando was intact, but when we reached Angeles we saw that the town was almost completely wiped out. It is said that it was burned by Communist elements. We reached a place from where we could see Camp Clark; a few places were still burning. We learned that many Japanese planes were either shot down or destroyed on the ground. There were also some American planes hit. We learned that Pres. Laurel and his family, who were in the first group, were very near the scene of the air battle and bombing. They also had to alight and hide.

When passing Tarlac we saw many planes coming. At first we thought they were American planes, but they were flying low. Evidently, a big transport carrying some high Japanese officers, was being escorted. The rest of the way we did not stop. We tried to go as fast as possible when approaching or passing airports and other military objectives. We did not encounter any more planes.

Alcohol fuel is really far from being as good as gasoline. All along the road cars belonging to different groups stalled. Many had to be pushed or’ repaired. Some cars had to be abandoned on the roadside, the occupants transferred to the military trucks with the Japanese and Philippine Constabulary soldiers. After a few hours, the motorcade broke up as most of the cars had stopped. The cars still running went ahead. All along the way the trucks loaded with Japanese soldiers never left us. When our car stalled, they also stopped and helped push our car. No car was able to arrive in Baguio before dusk. Some arrived before midnight of the 21st and some in the early morning of the 22nd. Some even arrived on the 23rd. Many cars were left behind. The occupants of cars that broken down in Kennon Road walked all the way to Baguio.

My family and I had the most sensational experience. My car ran smoothly until we entered Pangasinan when it stopped. It had to be pushed by Army trucks quite a long way before it would start again. This had to be repeated many times. At one point, the machine would not function anymore. A Japanese mechanic alighted from a truck and repaired the machine. He must have been a good mechanic as the machine started and we continued on our trip. After about 20 kilometers we stopped again. A truck tried to pull us with the intention of doing so up to Baguio. But my car was very big and heavy and it could not be pulled up the mountain road. The mechanic was able to make it function again. After stopping in Pozorrubio for fuel, at about six o’clock in the evening, we started the sleep climb to Baguio. Before reaching Camp one, the car stopped again. It had to be pushed for kilometers by Min. Recto’s car. In places, the roads were so narrow after a landslide; the fender skirts caught a high ground and the car got stuck. We removed the fender skirts but were convinced, however, that we could not continue the trip that way. Meanwhile, many cars had accumulated behind us and the occupants were becoming impatient. I heard them hooting. I was annoyed; I thought they ought to be more helpful. I told the chauffeur to stop the car, park it on the side of the road, and allow all the cars, including the one pushing us to pass. I was determined that we would sleep right there on the road. It was certainly difficult for my mother-in-law, my wife and my children. I could see that they were suffering, especially as it was already very cold. I was not sorry to stay; I was afraid to continue. My chauffeur had been rejected by the government insurance company for poor eyesight. He was also color blind. I should not have allowed him to drive, especially on narrow and dangerous roads like the Kennon Road. But the chauffeur continued to work on the car. Finally, to our amazement, it started to function.

By this time we were the only car on Kennon Road. We went quite fast. We could not slow down because everytime the car slowed down it would stop. We continued our way in quite a fast clip. We passed all the cars that hours before had left us. We reached Baguio several hours ahead of them. My chauffeur had never been to Baguio. So I had to direct him. We intended to go straight to the house reserved for us in Cabinet Hill. The road to Cabinet Hill was closed. We went ahead to the Pines Hotel. There we learned that the houses on Cabinet Hill were not ready since the present occupants had been given only a few days to vacate the houses — accommodations in Baguio were then very difficult. But the Pines Hotel was ready for us.

My chauffeur, who had never been to Pines Hotel, did not know the correct entrance. He entered through the exit. Since the driveway was very narrow which made it difficult for a car to back out, I walked to the hotel lobby where I got permission for us to approach the front entrance passing through the wrong way. From the entrance, I hailed my chauffeur to start the automobile and proceed. The road was steep and the car began to roll down, I was right in front of it. I hardly had time to jump out of the way. It was a narrow escape.

We went into the hotel. There was no food prepared for us so we passed the night hungry. We were given two small rooms where we had to sleep four to a bed. We suffered terribly.

I relate all these facts to show that we did not want to leave Manila voluntarily and that we were carried by threat and by force to Baguio.

I would also like to relate here the circumstances connected with the ₱15,000,000 of military notes and ₱1,000,000 of Commonwealth notes that we brought to Baguio.

Sometime on December 19, 1944, the Japanese adviser of the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Haraguti, accompanied by three Japanese officers, came to see me at my office. I was surprised at the sudden arrival of my visitors for I had not been informed of their coming. Haraguti, in the name and on behalf of the Japanese Army, demanded that all Philippine and American currency deposited and in the possession of the different Filipino banks be turned over to the Southern Development Bank, a bank owned and controlled by the Japanese government. As Minister of Finance, I had the sole discretion of affecting such a transfer with the final approval of the President. The Japanese did not go to Laurel directly because, in many previous occasions, Laurel told them that where money matters were involved he executes whatever his Minister of Finance recommends.

I protested vehemently. Haraguti cited a precedent — what the American High Commissioner did with reference to bank funds upon the commencement of the Pacific war. He said that the High Commissioner took possession of all the Philippine currency belonging to the different banks. I answered that the present case is different inasmuch as the Philippine Commonwealth was really under the American government, whereas at present the Philippines is an independent Republic formally recognized by the Japanese government. Haraguti insisted and I could see that the Japanese were determined to use force if necessary. I then asked him why they wanted to get the money. He answered that the purpose was to prevent their circulation. I then proposed that the Republic get the money for safekeeping. I added, however, that I would consult Pres. Laurel before making a definite decision. I thought they had accepted my proposition as they left without saying anything further.

I immediately went to see Pres. Laurel. I told Laurel that I was convinced that the Japanese were hell bent on confiscating the money and that we had no other recourse but to do all the means necessary to save the money. Pres. Laurel and I decided to meet with the managers of the banks concerned. Whatever is agreed upon by the managers and myself, would be considered as approved and ordered by the President.

The following day, I called the bank managers concerned and met with them in the office of the President of the Philippine National Bank on the Escolta. As I recall, the only banks then having Philippine or American currency were the Philippine National Bank, the Philippine Bank of Commerce, and the Bank of the Philippine Islands. The PNB was represented by Mr. Vicente Carmona, as bank President, while PBC and BPI were represented by their respective Vice President and General Manager, Miguel Cuaderno and Rafael Moreno. Felix de la Costa, director of the Bureau of Credits and Investment, was also present.

During the meeting I gave them an account of what happened. I told them that the only possible satisfactory solution would be for them to turn over the money to the Philippine government for safekeeping. I added that the money would be returned to them as soon as conditions become normal. They all readily agreed. With respect to the Philippine National Bank, no action was necessary as we were leaving all the money with the bank. I issued corresponding receipts to the banks for the amounts received as follows: Philippine National Bank, ₱490,529.00; Philippine Bank of Commerce, ₱425.200.00; and Bank of the Philippine Islands, ₱969.00. The total amount taken by my office was left and deposited with the Philippine National Bank. After leaving the bank, I went directly to Pres. Laurel to give my report. He approved all that had been done.

About a week prior to the above-mentioned events, Malacañan had advised all the Ministers that the Japanese were ordering all of us to go with them to Baguio. On December 20, 1944, an arrangement was made with the Philippine National Bank to load all the currency in the bank’s armored car which would go with us to Baguio. The person in charge of the armored car was Mr. Amado Lagdameo, the manager of the Baguio branch of PNB. Upon arrival in Baguio, the money was taken directly to and deposited in the Philippine National Bank branch.

In the evening of January 8, 1945, I received a letter from Manager Lagdameo reporting that Maj. I. Moritani accompanied by the Managers of the Bank of Taiwan and the Nampo Kaihatsu Kinko, forced him to hand over to them all the notes deposited in trust with the branch. Also taken were all the cash in the vault. He also wrote that he was not allowed to communicate with me by phone nor see me personally.

I immediately reported the matter to Pres. Laurel. I told him that what the Japanese had done was clearly illegal and improper. I recommended that Laurel make representations to the proper Japanese authorities immediately for the return of the currency seized as it was being held in trust by the Philippine Republic for the banks. Laurel protested strongly to the Japanese Ambassador and the Japanese military authorities demanding the return of the money. Up to the time when I escaped from Baguio on April 12, 1945, the money had not yet been returned. All that we were able to get was a receipt for the money from Col. Utsonomiya. All the original documents are in my possession.

July 3, 1945 Tuesday

The papers report that Confesor and Cabili have been appointed as members of the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission in Washington. Both will have to go to Washington. Cabile has resigned as Secretary of National Defense. His appointment and that of Confesor as Secretary of the Interior were submitted to the Commission on Appointments of Congress. The papers said that in view of their new offices, the Commission on Appointments will no longer have to act.

I suspect that the appointments of Confesor and Cabili have been disapproved, or at least Pres. Osmeña had been told or was convinced that their appointments would be disapproved by the Commission. The attitude of the Commission was expected. Both had been attacking the “collaborationists” and it seems that public opinion in Manila is favorable to the “collaborationists”. Both talk a lot, but have accomplished very little, especially as regards the economy. Both have been using language improper for high government officials. Both have been very much criticized, and it is even reported that they have to go around with body guards as their lives are in danger. The attitude of the Commission is fully justified. Their appointment to the Rehabilitation Commission is a face-saving stunt.

On June 28th, Pres. Truman said that he hoped the meeting next month with Churchill and Stalin would result in a formula for a final treaty that “will insure peace for generations to come.”

We hope they will succeed. Such is the prayer of all the people in the world. War is so terrible that it must be avoided by all means. We do not know what the formula will be. Surely all the causes of war must be eliminated. To me colonization is one of the causes. It should be abolished as a thing of the past. All countries must be granted independence.

Jose Abad Santos was Secretary of Justice in Pres. Quezon’s Cabinet when the war broke out. Before his appointment to that office he had held many other important offices such as Justice of the Supreme Court. He was a great jurist. He accompanied Pres. Quezon in Corregidor, visited front lines in Bataan and traveled with Quezon to the South. When the presidential party left for Australia in 1942, Abad Santos remained with powers to represent the President in areas not under Japanese control. He was subsequently captured by the Japanese and reliable reports are to the effect that he had been killed by the Japanese. On June 27th, Pres. Osmeña said of him: “The late Secretary Abad Santos will go down in history as one of the most outstanding heroes of this war. Abad Santos is a real hero, a true patriot and should be held up before the youth as a model.”

According to the Free Philippines of June 29th, the President “emphasized Abad Santos chose to die rather than collaborate.”

The death of Abad Santos is still shrouded in mystery. Lt. Abad Santos, Jr. supposed to be a witness to his father’s death and, consequently, may be able to tell the whole story, was taken by the Japanese to Tokyo.

Abad Santos’ other son, Osmundo, entrusted to us in Baguio a sealed envelop containing confidential papers concerning Justice Abad Santos. They may reveal all the facts which we would like to know.

The tribute paid by Pres. Osmeña to Secretary Abad Santos is well deserved. He is truly a great man. I have already stated above what we did to try to save Secretary Abad Santos. We knew that he was an Orientalist and we thought this fact could save him so we told it to the Japanese authorities. But Abad Santos unluckily fell into the hands of a crazed and cruel man — Col. Kawakami. Col. Kawakami executed him before we could do anything for him.

The fact that Osmeña emphasized his statement that Abad Santos chose to die rather than collaborate with the Japanese is very significant. It is an attack on Roxas. Undoubtedly, it was a “hit back” on account of the bitter criticism launched by Roxas against Osmeña’s administration. It is a biting criticism of Roxas. Now the fight is on. No way to avoid it. Both Osmeña and Roxas will be candidates for President.

The statement of Osmeña, of course, also applies to us. We hope that it will not change or prejudice his attitude towards supposed collaborationists. After all, on account of our imprisonment in Iwahig we had nothing to do and could have nothing to do with the criticism of Roxas against him.

The question arose as to whether the fight between Osmeña and Roxas will favor or prejudice us. There is a difference of opinion. Recto believes it will favor us, as both would want to get our support. If not for this fight, we would be forgotten and left to rot here. In my opinion, it will prejudice us. Both may be too busy with the preparation of their respective platforms and with the campaign that we may be forgotten. At the present time, it is not known who among us are for Osmeña or Roxas. If the majority of us are in favor of Osmeña, Roxas may block our release through his friend. Gen. MacArthur, who before was not very friendly to Osmeña. If we are inclined towards Roxas, Osmeña may want us detained until after elections or after the war, and it is probably within his power as President to do so.

We had a meeting where we pledged to bind ourselves together as one. We will found a newspaper to be financed by Mr. Madrigal which shall be our organ for the propaganda of our platform, policies and aims. What these platform, policies and aims are, we have not determined. But we are agreed on two matters. First, we shall seek our exoneration and vindication from the charge of “collaborationists” with the implications of disloyalty and treason to our country and anti-Americanism. Second, we shall assist actively and wholeheartedly in the rehabilitation work of our country. As regards independence, there may be one or two dissenting voices, and the rest will be aggressively in favor. Needless to say, we will go after those who have been responsible for our imprisonment or who have been unjustly attacking us.

All these plans may lead to the formation of a party which will put up candidates for all positions, including those of president and vice president. With the men now with us who have repeatedly enjoyed the trust and confidence of our people, and who still retain this hold on their constituents, together with the thousands of persons also arrested, humiliated and imprisoned like us, the new party will be a formidable one. If we continue to be united and we all work vigorously, we may even win in the elections and thus be in power.

Pres. Osmeña has two sons imprisoned in Bilibid and later in Muntinglupa. They are being charged with being collaborationists for having engaged in the “buy and sell business” with the Japanese Army and Navy as the biggest purchasers in so far as war materials are concerned. Really, Serging Osmeña was one of the big “buy and sell” men and he made a lot of money. It is reported that he was able to pay the big indebtedness of his father. He established a company called “ESSO” and my son, Tony, was Treasurer and trusted official of the Company. Apparently, the young Osmeñas were expecting help from their father. It seems that such help was not extended. The father was indifferent. Furthermore, he made a statement to the press praising a son who worked against the Japanese and stating that he could not intervene in the cases of Serging and Nicasio. This peaked the anger of Serging. He immediately wrote a letter to his father stating among other things: “We have lost our mother, now we lose our father.” Serging complained that they had never been attended to by the father; he left them nothing. It was a very bitter and at the same time pathetic denunciation of his own father.

I do not know whether I would have done what Serging, Jr. did even if placed under the same circumstances. I do not believe I could do it. A father is a father; the children owe their existence to him. No matter how bad he may be, he must never be denounced by the children. This is especially so in the case of Pres. Osmeña. He is the President of the Republic. It is very embarrassing for him to have sons imprisoned for collaboration. Rather, Serging and Nick should have begged their father’s forgiveness for having placed him in such a situation. Furthermore, there are thousands imprisoned for the same reasons; Osmeña as President could not favor his own sons and not do the same for the others, unless he wants to be accused of favoritism and injustice.

Later reports are to the effect that Serging had retracted and he was awfully sorry for what he did. I am happy to hear this.

It is reported that President Osmeña had sent word to Serging and Nick that he will order the release of persons personally known to him with he himself as guarantor. This may be what induced Serging to change. If true, it will benefit not only his sons but many of us here who are not only known to Osmeña but are also his personal friends. This is especially so in my case. This has revived the hope of many.

Romulo is reported to have said that Roxas is no longer liked by MacArthur. If this is so, the interest that Roxas is taking in us may be prejudicial. But I seriously doubt the truth of the report of Romulo. If it is true, Roxas would not have been returned to active service as General and he probably would have been imprisoned just like us.

In turns out that the Dr. Sison reported here earlier who was snubbed by Romulo is not Agerico but Antonio. Dr. Antonio Sison is the family doctor of the Romulos and has never collected any fee from them. He saved the life of Romulo twice. When the incident happened it is reliably reported that Dr. Sison was indignant. This is the same Romulo that had been attacking the supposed “collaborationists.”

July 2, 1945 Monday

The Sunday Times of June 24, 1945 reports that new parties are being organized. Three parties will probably fight for power and control of the government in the November elections. Despite efforts to bring about a reconciliation of warring leaders of the party in power, the split up of the Nacionalista party into two factions is inevitable as a result of developments in the Philippine Congress.

A third political group is reliably reported as being formed, led by intellectuals pledged to support a program of government more liberal and more socially conscious than embraced in the platform of the ruling party. Roxas will be leader of the Nacionalista left wing and Osmeña of the administration party. There will be a fight in the convention for nominations, but the losing group will put up a ticket of its own. Independent big wigs are being invited to join the third party. Inactive political groups like the Sumulong popular front and the Abad Santos socialist party are also being courted. The new group may not be able to put up a complete ticket, but they will have candidates for the positions except President and Vice President.

Bad news. The United States civilian relief activities in the Philippines will be discontinued on Sept. 1, 1945. The Philippine government will therefore assume the activities and the full responsibility. This is a mistake and our government should have left no stone unturned to have the American aid continued. The Philippine government will not be in a condition to undertake the financing of such tremendous work.

The Associated Press dispatch of June 20, 1945, released in San Francisco, reports that, “At a press conference, the civilian Philippine delegation headed by Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, who was one of the leaders of the campaign to include an outright guarantee of independence in the charters, has accepted the self government formula.” This attitude was probably induced by the opinion of Premier Fraser of New Zealand and others, that there is no difference between self-government, self-determination and independence.

I cannot understand why such a change, proposed by the United Nations trusteeship committee, was ever accepted by Romulo and our delegation. If there is no difference as contended by Fraser, why change the text proposed by Romulo, which is very clear. The fact, however, is that there is a whale of a difference between independence and self-government. The former admits of no interpretation other than that the country concerned will be granted independence; whereas the self-government theory, besides the fact that it presupposes delay, may not ultimately lead to independence. The very explanation of Fraser bears this out. According to the news, he “pointed to the increasing importance of inter-dependence in world affairs.” Inter­dependence means that one or both countries have some more or less permanent” relations. If the new provision means that there shall be progressive development of self-government until independence is granted, who shall determine whether the self-government has advanced to such degree that independence may be granted? If it is the trustee who will decide whether or not a country is ready for self-government, which trustee will undoubtedly be the present corresponding colonizing country, then we may as well forget all about it. If it is the so-called Big Five, composed of England, United States, Soviet Russia, France and China, we also better forget all about it. England and France are colonizing countries and they naturally will want to defend their power and authority over the country under trusteeship now forming part of their colonies. Soviet Russia is ambitious She has expanded and will continue to expand. She has been doing this by means of some sort of plebiscite which everybody knows is just a mere formula since the results are obtained by threats, or by organizing puppet governments under the orders of Soviet Russia. This is precisely what she is trying to do now in connection with Poland. I hope the other countries of the Big Four will not be hoodwinked. China will be interested to guarantee absolute independence, as this is precisely her national policy to protect herself from the continuance of incursions in her territory. But she is too weak for the present and cannot wield any influence.

The United States should be interested in guaranteeing independence. In connection with the Philippines, she chose a course which entitled her to be justly considered as the cradle of liberty. But there are certain factors to be considered here. The United States for the present is the most highly developed in so far as economics are concerned. Her people are hardworking but at the same time they believe in amusing themselves as much as possible. Between business activities and their propensity for enjoyment, they have no time for anything else. This is the reason why at times their Congress does things that may not be to the liking of the American people. This also enables lobbyists to wield much influence in Washington. There are well organized lobbying offices in Washington which are heavily financed. They employ expert lobbyists and men who are well connected with high government executives and influential members of Congress. Practically all big interests in America are represented in Washington. The sugar interest, especially Cuban, was so powerful that to porect the Philippine sugar, the Philippine Sugar Association had to employ an influential ex-Senator (ex-Senator Hawes) with personal and intimate relations with members of Congress, as its Representative in Washington. I shall never forget our experience when I was a member of an Economic Mission to the United States in 1938-1939. To be able to get a little amendment to the provision of the Tydings-McDuffie Law involving our abaca product, we had to approach and convince one Mr. McDaniel, the representative of the Cordage Association of America. The chairman of the committee in the Senate would not even consider it unless we could have an understanding with Mr. McDaniel.

Furthermore, the United States is a representative democracy. They organize the government through parties that fight in the elections for control. Each party has a platform at times just the opposite of the platform of the other party. When a party wins, it naturally endeavors to carry out its policies and points of view as expressed in its platform. This is the reason why there is no continuity in American policies. This precisely is what happened in connection with our Jones Law passed under a Democratic regime. It promised independence when a stable government would have been established in the Philippines. Later, the Republican Party was elevated to power. It reversed the Democratic policy and paid no attention to the stable government provision. To justify its policy, it even denied that there was ever a valid promise of independence in the law. The Republican Party sent the Wood-Forbes Missions here to investigate. These missions reported so many anomalies here to show that there was no stable government.

For these reasons, we cannot be sure that the present attitude of the American government toward trusteeship will be a permanent one.

The trusteeship provision must have been proposed or at least inspired by the English. With it they meant to perpetuate their hold on their present colonies, like India. In so far as they are concerned, it will merely be a change of name — instead of colonization, it will be trusteeship. But in susbstance and in actuality, nothing will change.

The provision is also not clear as to whether the independence to be granted will be both political and economic. The modern tendency now is to grant political independence, but continue the economic control. To me, this system is just as bad if not worse than political dependence. Economic dependence is just as effective as political dependence to control a country. The country concerned will not be able to plan, develop and follow its economic policies. This is precisely what happened to the Philippines when the free trade was established — as a consequence, our whole economy became tightly intertwined with that of America. When the date for independence was fixed, we tried to extricate ourselves from American economic control. But what happened? Everytime we planned something which might affect American interests, we were stopped. We could not approve legislation which might effectuate the substitution of American business by Filipino business. We could not have diplomatic intercourse with other nations to ascertain what advantageous economic treaties we could enter into. We always had to consider American interests. This meant also that we could not negotiate reciprocity treaties with other nations, as has been done with America. How can we plan for self-sufficiency and economic independence under these circumstances? This is precisely the reason why I resigned as Chairman of the National Economic Council during the administration of Pres. Quezon. Everytime I proposed something which might affect American interests, I was stopped. When I proposed that we approach certain nations to see whether we could get some reciprocity agreements under which we could exchange products or export our excess products to those nations, I was warned not to endanger our economic relationship with America. All these support my thesis that independence must be both political and economic.