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Month June 1942

June 30, 1942

Lifted my telephone, overheard a conversation:

“Don’t you recognize me?”

“Who… who are you?”

“Guess.”

“I can’t imagine. If you don’t tell me who you are, I will have to close the phone. I do not speak to strangers.”

“It’s me darling, it’s me. Teddy.”

“Darling… Teddy… you’re back… oh, I’m so happy.”

“I’m so happy too. I never dreamt I’d be able to hear your voice again.”

“Tell me how you are? Are you all right? Have you also got malaria?”

“Yes, once in a while. Had an attack yesterday. But let’s not talk about myself. How are you? Have you put on weight? Do you still play tennis? Can… can I see you tomorrow?”

“One at a time, Ted. Yes, I’m alright. I lost weight. And of course, you can see me tomorrow. First thing in the morning. And you’re going to have lunch with me. And by the way, bring Johnnie along, too.”

“Oh Johnnie… why, he… he…”

“Don’t tell me that Johnnie…”

“Yes… while on patrol… Please tell Nena. He told me that in case he doesn’t come back to tell Nena he was always thinking of her. He seemed to have a premonition.”

“How can I tell her that?”

‘‘That was his last wish.”

“Is there no chance of his being alive?”

“I’m afraid not, besides… oh, well, we had better talk about this in your house. Not over the telephone.”

I’ll wait for you tomorrow, then.”

“By the way, Mary … do you … do you still love me? Or is there someone else?”

I closed the phone. That would be eavesdropping!

 

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June 30,1942

Per my request, Mrs. Cristina M. Cuenca, Malolos Women’s Club President, asked Bulacan Gov. Rustia to find out from the Japanese Adm. if the Malolos POWs are not included in the announced “benevolent Filipino Sick POWs Release Policy”.

Early this morning, Gov. Rustia and Mrs. Cuenca visited Malolos POW Camp to inform us of his findings. He said that, according to the Japanese Adm., all Filipino sick POW releases will be done only in Capas and the first batch is scheduled today. He, therefore, suggested that if we want to take advantage of the release policy, that we request for transfer to Capas.

Because even our friend, Mrs. Cuenca, agreed with the suggestion of our good governor, as the senior officer of our group and on their behalf, I requested that we be transferred to Capas, Tarlac where the rest of our POW comrades are being held. The governor promised to transmit our request for transfer to the Japanese Authorities concerned.

June 28, 1942

Tears.

Tears of joy.

Mothers embracing sons as they walked out of the prison camp in O’Donnell.

It was the most touching sight ever seen in this country. The defeated troops have been allowed to return to their homes.

The Tribune carries the picture of a Filipino private with his USAFFE cap walking with a piece of stick on one hand, to support his thin body. On his haggard face, was a faint smile. He had done his duty to his country. His family surrounded him and his mother was supporting his left hand.

There were tragedies too.

Some boys died on the train on their way home. Release had come too late.

One mother arrived in camp very happy. She brought a jitney for her son. When his name was called, there was no son. The mother was worried. One soldier said: “He just died, madam.”

Even Japanese soldiers watching the meeting between parents and sons who had served their country shed tears.

War is blood and tears.

 

June 26, 1942

Guerillas have answered the Japanese warning. They posted bills all over downtown Manila exhorting the Japanese to surrender to them.

June 25, 1942

Quezon is very much exercised because he found that the Army Intelligence Service had discovered that Colonel Andres Soriano, his Secretary of Finance, had been one of Franco’s fascists. And now they were investigating the loyalty of Soriano and of Quezon himself. Quezon busy dictating a strong letter of protest to Secretary of War Stimson. The letter was sent by hand. Quezon called the Secretary of War personally on the telephone, and Stimson replied: “Don’t take them seriously.” Quezon: “But I do–very.” Stimson: “Well, then, let me tell you a story: when I entered the Army in 1917 they at once put me in the intelligence division. The first afternoon I was there, I read that every second man I knew was a ‘spy.’ I’ll call in General Strong and give him hell.” Quezon added that the Army Intelligence is also investigating a foreign ambassador in Washington.

Pacific War Council that day.

Roosevelt said that the reason the Atlantic Charter had omitted all reference to freedom of religion was because neither Churchill, (who was present at the meeting) nor he, had thought enough about religion to remember to put it in. (N.B. this was disingenuous in view of the photograph published at the time showing Churchill and Roosevelt sitting side-by-side on the deck of the Prince of Wales singing each from a hymn book.) Roosevelt added: “Churchill and I forgot it–that is the fact, but I couldn’t very well admit that.”

Roosevelt remarked that King Peter of Yugoslavia was interested only in the Hollywood girls. “I’ll have to send for a couple of them.”

Quezon says that at the Pacific War Council Churchill looked across the table in a puzzled way at him, but when he heard Roosevelt refer to him by name, he had a look of interest and after the meeting, came around the table and shook hands saying: “I’ve never had a chance to meet you before and I am very glad of the present opportunity to congratulate you on the gallant fight put up by your people. We consider it to have been a very great contribution to the war effort.”

Harry Hopkins said to Quezon: “I see you are the best dressed man on the Council.” The Minister from New Zealand expressed doubt. Quezon replied: “I heard a radio speech in English from a Japanese saying that the Filipinos had lost all their virtues as Oriental people due to the influence of Spain and the United States. All that they care about now is to be well-dressed, so that people will look at them.” Hopkins got quite red–he has no sense of humour, which Roosevelt, on the other hand, has in such abundance.

Roosevelt minimized the taking of the two outermost of the Aleutian Islands by the Japanese, but added: “I don’t know what my friend Mackenzie King thinks of it–he lives nearer than I do.” Mackenzie King did not seem to be so unconcerned over it as was Roosevelt.

Roosevelt was asked if he was sure of the victory of his party in the coming Congressional elections–he said “Well–no. But I was Governor of New York with a Republican Senate, a Republican House; and I think I can kid them along.”

National Defense Act of the Philippines. Quezon said: “As soon as I had agreed with the President and Congressional leaders on a new independence law (Tydings-Mc-Duffie Act) which eliminated the provision for keeping the United States Army in the Philippines after independence should be attained, I realized the responsibility we had assumed for the defense of the Philippines. During the last world war, we had organized a Philippine National Guard, but American Army leaders had never encouraged the maintenance of this. So, this time, I realized that my first task would be to prepare the Philippines when free to assume the responsibility for its own defense. I went at once to see General Douglas MacArthur in Washington; he was the best informed–the one man to advise me. The following conversation ensued:

“Q.: ‘General, I wish to ask you some questions and I hope you will answer them fully or not at all–be very frank. Do you think the Philippines if independent can be effectively defended against a first class power?’

“MacA.: ‘I not only think so, but I know so.’

“Q.: ‘Would you be willing to assume the responsibility of preparing the Philippines to defend itself?’

“MacA.: ‘Yes, if the President will allow me.’

“Q.: ‘How much do you think it would cost?’

“MacA.: ‘How much are you now spending on the Constabulary?’

“Q.: ‘About 6,000,000 pesos annually.’

“MacA.: ‘Add to that 10,000,000 pesos each year for ten years–it can be done.’

“Q.: ‘Yes. If I am elected president, that very day I will wire inviting you to come to the Philippines at once.’

“We next agreed that an American law then in force authorizing the President to send, on request, military missions to the South American countries should be amended to extend also to the Philippines.”

Quezon added to me: “I saw Roosevelt again and asked him to let me have MacArthur, and to have this law amended; that was done before I left Washington.

“I was then very much encouraged as to our national defense problem. I believed every word MacArthur said, and felt very confident. But I suspected that the War Department was not very enthusiastic over our plan; I felt this still more so when my friend General Harbord came to Manila a couple of years later; he said nothing about the Philippine Army–either for or against.

“Back in the Philippines, I went for everybody who criticized our National Defense Act. But when in 1939, I saw Czecho-Slovakia and Poland fall–saw Germany defeat them so easily though they had far more by way of defense than we could acquire even at the end of ten years, I began to weaken. I then told the Cabinet that I feared I was spending more money on the National Defense than was justified. If nations like Poland and Czecho-Slovakia can be overwhelmed so quickly, it is possible they would also do it to us. Better, perhaps for us not to waste so much money.

“So, I began to hesitate; I told MacArthur and Sayre. Upon one occasion I made a statement to newspaper men that I was not as confident as I had been before of the ability of an independent Philippines to defend itself against a first class power. MacArthur did not contradict my newspaper statement, but he never lost faith in his work. I called him before the Cabinet and told him my doubts as to the effectiveness of our plans. He replied that he had always taken it for granted that our own defense would be implemented by the United States Navy.

“Of course, my concern was not over the situation of the Philippines so long as we remained under the flag of the United States. I felt first, that no other nation would dare to attack the United States, and, second, that in case of attack, we would not have to rely upon ourselves alone, that the prime responsibility for the Philippines would rest on the United States. Whatever we might have would be just that much help.

“At the beginning of November 1940, I gave notice to all Americans in the service of the Commonwealth that I could not commit myself to them beyond my own term of Office–so they all had a year’s notice before the election of November 10, 1941. I added: ‘I am not a candidate for re-election.’ I had no disagreement whatever with MacArthur; I intended to keep him but would not commit myself or tell him so. He asked me ‘What will you do if you are re-elected?’ I refused to explain and said to him, ‘If you find something you find more satisfactory, take it.’

“The result of the election of November 1941 was much bigger than before. Only Sumulong ran against me. He died later when I was in Corregidor.”

June 25, 1942

Not all the people have surrendered to the Japanese. Guerilla activities continue unabated in the hills. The Japanese have issued a warning to all guerillas to surrender by the end of June 1942. The warning ended with the exhortation: “Don’t repent too late by continuing your futile resistance and letting this best chance for you to surrender slip by.”

Mr. Takizawa found a guerilla pass on his desk. Attached was a letter from a guerillero. “You are a good Japanese. So use this pass to save your life when the time comes.”

 

June 25,1942

Today I got good and bad news. The good news from Mrs. Cristina Magsaysay Cuenca is that according to reliable information from the Japanese Adm., with their new policy to get the good side of our people, will begin releasing sick Filipino POWs at Capas by the end of this month. I requested her to ask Gov. Rustia to inquire if we are not included in this release policy as we also have ‘several sick’ POWs in Malolos Camp and she promised to do that.

The bad news is from the underground “Free Phil.” latest issue saying that after the fall of Tobruk in Africa, the British Forces were badly beaten and pushed 60 miles from Libya to Egypt by German Forces under Gen. Rommel with 25,000 British taken POWs. This news is, however, offset by the announcement that Maj. Gen. Eisenhower has assumed command of the US Forces in the European Theater of operation signaling a decision to open a second front in Europe.

June 23, 1942

People do not seem to understand how to organize a neighborhood association. They don’t read the instructions carefully. When they don’t get their rice, they complain.

The heads of families in a certain neighborhood may formally organize themselves into a Neighborhood Association. An association generally consists of 23 heads of families. Membership, however, could be more or less, provided that the total number of dependents will be at least 92 persons.

These are the steps:

1. A group of about 92 persons or more living close together may unite themselves to form an association, to be considered later as a “Neighborhood Association.”

2. The members of an association will be composed of the heads of the different families who will select a leader.

3. The members will certify to the Naric their chosen leader.

4. Every head of the family will be requested to present his residence certificate or his ration card to the chosen leader in order to be filed with the Naric.

5. The chosen leader will prepare all the necessary papers to be submitted to the Naric.

6. Every head of the family will certify as to the number of his dependents, such certification to be countersigned and certified correct by the leader of the association.

7. As soon as all the papers are completed and prepared, the same will be presented to the Naric for necessary investigation and final approval.

8. If the application is approved by the Naric, the association is legitimately formed and is entitled to receive ration.

The ideal Neighborhood Association is that which consists of 23 heads of families with four persons in each family, or a total of 92 persons.

On the basis of 300 grams per person per day, those 92 persons will be an ideal number to share equally one cavan of rice, since one cavan contains 23 gantas or more, and one ganta weighs 2.4 kilos.

If 300 grams will be allowed each person daily, a family of four persons will receive a ration of 1,200 grams or 1.2 kilos daily, or 2.4 kilos every other day.

Saw Japanese troops feeding their horses with rice.

 

June 22, 1942

Japanese authorities announced that the use of traveling pass by the public is no longer required.

Saw a Japanese officer’s car crash against a rig. The Japanese got a hold of the “cochero,” boxed his face, kicked his body and whipped the horse. The cochero lay on the street unconscious, his face bleeding. People looked on sullenly, angrily.

Somebody whispered. “Someday… someday…”

 

June 22, 1942

Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon returned from a conference with Secretary Ickes, whom he greatly likes.

He is getting more interested every day in composing ideas for his book, which I am glad to see. Today, he expressed his wish not to have any controversial subjects in this war story, but will save them for the biography he wishes to write later. He may insert Japanese atrocity stories of their invasion of the Philippines, but only “as told to him”–not as being of his knowledge true. This settles neatly a ticklish question of policy.

Quezon observed that Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles is more “effective” than our old friend Hull, and believes it best to sound him out first on any plans for the future of the Philippines.

Stated that he had told ex-Vice Governor Hayden that in his book he had been so kind about him that he felt he could say in criticism only that Hayden appeared to be an adherent of Governor General Wood–“You are still a Republican”–Hayden reddened. Quezon told him that the theory that Leonard Wood had “saved” Philippine finances was ridiculous. “If I had not stopped him, he would have thrown away assets worth three hundred million pesos in the Philippines.” Hayden replied “I suppose you mean the railroad, bank, etc.”

Lord Halifax had given Quezon a luncheon. This was the day after Quezon’s first appearance upon the Pacific War Council. Halifax said to Quezon at luncheon: “I liked your remark to the press.” Quezon said he liked Lady Halifax better than he did her husband. She had told Halifax after luncheon: “You’d better have a talk with President Quezon–You may learn something.”

Mrs. Quezon who was then present with us, had just attended a luncheon given for her by Mrs. Sayre. Sayre is about to resign as High Commissioner. She told Mrs. Quezon that there had been a broadcast from Manila in May arranged by the Japanese. In it an American lady told how the American civilian prisoners at Santo Tomas in Manila were allowed to establish their own form of government; had their own entertainments and their own schools for their children. Exercise was allowed daily in Santo Tomas grounds etc. She then added that their chief concern was that they had no milk for their children–at this point a Japanese spokesman interrupted and said: “That is the fault of the Americans for destroying all supplies before we arrived.” I asked Mrs. Quezon if it was true that they had destroyed all the food supplies before going to Corregidor, and she replied “Of course.”

I then asked Quezon further about his famous luncheon with the Japanese Emperor in 1937–whether the Emperor had offered him any “special treaties” (n.b. this was one of the questions recently submitted to Quezon by the Cosmopolitan). He said “no.” I asked him whether Ambassador Grew’s annoyance with this whole affair had not changed the United States Government’s attitude toward Quezon for a time. He said not; that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were all right, but that he might have had some enemies, like Stanley Hornbeck, the “Far Eastern expert” in the State Department. Denied that the State Department had interfered to spoil his subsequent trip to Mexico; that the Mexican President had sent him his gorgeous $500,000 train,–“like a hotel” to convey him to Mexico City.

Told the story of his shift in plans during his escape to Australia in going from Dumaguete by speed boat with Lieutenant Bulkeley across to Mindanao. Wainwright had wired him that there were five Japanese destroyers in the straits, and it was inadvisable to go now–better to postpone. But Colonel Soriano together with Major Fernando of the Philippine Army Air Corps had just spent several hours in one of those old planes off Negros waters. They had sighted only one Japanese destroyer, which at 6 p.m. had gone off towards the Sulu Sea. So, after midnight, when he and his family, having received Wainwright’s warning message, had gotten nearly all the way back from Dumaguete to Bais (20 miles), Soriano caught up with them in the dark, and he and Bulkeley advised Quezon to turn around again and take the chance of getting across that night to Mindanao. Quezon accepted.

To an enquiry as to whether Mrs Quezon ever expressed her opinions about such decisions on this dangerous voyage; he replied: “Never; she always did just what I decided.” I then enquired how he had felt about the possibility of his capture by the Japanese? He said he did his best to avoid capture, but he always felt that if taken by them, they would treat him with every consideration, and probably put him right back in Malacañan.

He added that he thought Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos had gotten caught by the Japanese in Cebu. (N.B. they shot him there).

Exchange of cables between Quezon in Corregidor and Roosevelt: Quezon advised him that he was in grave doubts as to whether he should encourage his people to further resistance since he was satisfied that the United States could not relieve them; that he did not see why a nation which could not protect them should expect further demonstrations of loyalty from them. Roosevelt in reply, said he understood Quezon’s feelings and expressed his regret that he could not do much at the moment. He said: “go ahead and join them if you feel you must.” This scared MacArthur. Quezon says: “If he had refused, I would have gone back to Manila.” Roosevelt also promised to retake the Philippines and give them their independence and protect it. This was more than the Filipinos had ever had offered them before: a pledge that all the resources and man power of United States were back of this promise of protected independence. So Quezon replied: “I abide by your decision.”

I asked him why he supposed Roosevelt had refused the joint recommendation of himself and MacArthur. He replied that he did not know the President’s reasons. Osmena and Roxas had said at the time that he would reject it. Roosevelt was not moved by imperialism nor by vested interests, nor by anything of that sort. Probably he was actuated by unwillingness to recognize anything Japan had done by force (vide Manchuria). Quezon thinks that in Washington only the Chief of Staff (General Marshall) who received the message from MacArthur in private code, and Roosevelt himself, knew about this request for immediate independence.

When Quezon finally got to the White House, Roosevelt was chiefly concerned about Quezon’s health. Roosevelt never made any reference to their exchange of cables.

Quezon added that, so far as he was aware, the Japanese had never made a direct offer to the United States Government to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines, but many times they made such an offer to him personally.

“It was not that I apprehended personally ill treatment from the Japanese” said Quezon; “What made me stand was because I had raised the Philippine Army–a citizen army–I had mobilized them in this war. The question for me was whether having called them, I should go with this army, or stay behind in Manila with my people. I was between the Devil and the deep sea. So I decided that I should go where the army did. That was my hardest decision–my greatest moral torture. I proposed by cable to President Roosevelt that the United States Government should advise the Japanese that they had granted independence to the Philippines. This should have been done before the invasion and immediately after the first Japanese attack by air. The Japanese had repeatedly offered to guarantee the neutrality of an independent Philippines. This was what they thought should be done.” Quezon is going to propose the passage by Congress of a Joint Resolution, as they did in the case of Cuba, that “the Philippines are and of right out to be independent” and that “the United States would use their armed forces to protect them.”

When asked by Shuster to try to describe his own frame of mind when he was told at 5:30 a.m. Dec. 8 of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Quezon said he had never believed that the Japanese would dare to do it; but since they had done so, it was at once evident that they were infinitely more powerful than had been supposed– therefore he immediately perceived that the Philippines were probably doomed.

In Washington the other day, he asked the Chinese Ambassador whether the Japanese had not fooled all the rest of the world by pretending to be weak. The ambassador just laughed. Quezon says that if consulted, he would have advised the Chinese to take a leaf from the Japanese book on cunning. The Japanese had been checked in their expansion plans three times, (after each of their three successful wars), by the concert of Great Powers–each time they “bowed their head” and submitted. Finally, after waiting nearly half a century, their chance had come, and they took it. So, if the Chinese, at the time the “China Incident” broke had pretended to submit, then allowed themselves to be armed and trained by the Japanese, they would only have had to wait their chance.

June 20, 1942

Today, being a Saturday, Bulacan Gov. Emilio Rustia attended the weekend evening Mass with us at POW Camp Malolos. After the services by Fr. Lipana, I invited him in my office to express my gratitude for his medical officers effort taking good care of our sick. There are no casualties so far in this POW Camp, we even increased in number by three since our arrival last April 10.

I had a most enlightening private conversation with the governor about Realism and Idealism. He started saying peace and order in Bulacan have virtually returned to normalcy and this is confirmed by reports of my relatives in Plaridel. He had recommended to Japanese Authorities for the opening of classes in all schools. He said, after a secret meeting of all elected municipal and provincial officials early last Jan., they unanimously decided to collaborate with the new masters as a realistic strategy to serve our people because if they did not, the Japanese would have appointed other individuals who were not elected, inexperienced in public service with selfish ends. He claims their collective strategy appears working as they have good rapport with the Japanese and obtaining conditions in Bulacan looks good. For one thing, we have nothing to complain about as POWs.

Gov. Rustia cited the case of the island of Panay, particularly the province of Iloilo whose elected Gov. Tomas Confesor and his Municipal Mayors chose the Idealistic Strategy of not collaborating to appear patriotic and courageous by trying to fight back. The Japanese appointed a medical doctor Fermin Caram as Governor and his followers who were not duly elected as Municipal Mayors with the result that the Japanese landed thousands of troops to hunt down Confesor and his followers and the entire island still in turmoil. Gov. Rustia believes Confesor’s decision to be idealistic does not serve the good of his people due to lack of logistics and trained military of his own. When Pres. Quezon designated his Exec. Sec. Jorge Vargas to head a group to collaborate with the Japanese before he moved to Corregidor, that was realism.

I thank the governor for that enlightening conversation and after he left, it occurred to me that I also committed the same idealistic notion as Gov. Confesor when I threw my PMA Class Ring at sea (a foolish thing I did) when I was surrounded by the enemy and realized I was a POW. How I longed for that ring that gave me inner strength when I wore it.

June 18, 1942

New rice ration plan adopted yesterday. I hope it works out well. It will meet with a lot of objections. People do not want rationing. We are not used to a regimented economy.

Tony Vasquez dropped in at the office. He asked me to explain the new system. He was breathing hard. He biked from the hospital. I think he is too old to bike.

 

June 17, 1942

Food production campaign not going on well. People are discouraged to plant. When fields are all planted, the fields are commandeered. Some are transformed to airfields. Payment given does not compensate for value of the products.

This is the trouble with the Japanese. They want the people to like them but they slap the people and torture them.

They want something for nothing all the time.

They can’t eat the cake and keep it.

Lolita baked a cake. Vic ate one-half.

 

June 16, 1942

Talked to Fukada regarding Mr. Inada. I told Fukada that Inada must be told to change his arrogant ways. He cannot treat Filipinos like dogs. Personally, he has not been rude to me. But I resent his rudeness to fellow Filipinos.

Fukada asked me to be patient.

The Japanese are thinking of introducing Hori rice. They are excited about it. Hori rice seems more glutinous.

Walked home. Walking is a good exercise.

 

June 16,1942

The Malolos Women’s Club under the leadership of Mrs. Cristina Magsaysay Cuenca continues to help the Malolos POWs. As mentioned before, when they found out that we were sleeping on bare cold concrete prison floors during our early days here, they lost no time providing each of us mattresses and other beddings including mosquito nets. Today Mrs. Cuenca accompanied by her able assistant, Miss Luming Flor R. Cruz (whose brother, Perico, is graduating from West Point this month) visited us. I learned from them that they have already made two trips each to Camp O’Donnell and Camp Cabanatuan bringing medicine. They told us the deplorable conditions of POWs at O’Donnell where daily deaths are reported at 400 to 500. Other Ladies Group leaders performing similar civic assistance to POWs at Camp O’Donnell Mrs. Cuenca mentioned are Mrs. Josefa Llanes Escoda, Mrs. Pilar Hidalgo Lim (wife of Gen. Vicente Lim) and Miss Lulu Reyes, a prominent social worker of Ermita well known to OSP student officers of Class ’41 that boarded with her.

And so today, let me salute all our courageous and patriotic women for all their effort to help our POWs where ever they are.

June 15-16, 1942

Quezon tells me that when he went to Corregidor on December 24 last, part of the “doubts” about the policy he should adopt were based upon the possibility of a declaration by the Japanese of Philippine independence. This thought was, for him, a “nightmare.” We would have been left in an impossible situation, for if he accepted, the United States would have turned against him, and if he refused, his own people might have repudiated him. He thought that if, after the Burma campaign, the Japanese had proclaimed the independence of India, it would have started a revolution there.

It was not until he got to the Visayas after February 20th and had talked to people down there, and especially with those who at the risk of their lives, had escaped from Luzon, that he was able to gauge the real sentiments of his people. Among these was Tomas Confesor, who had escaped from Bauang in a boat provided by the “Quisling” Mayor of the town, who had been selected by the Japanese to replace the constitutionally appointed mayor, since the latter had been killing all the Japs he could get at. “Incidentally,” said Quezon, “these Filipino ‘Quislings’ were like those Filipino officials appointed by the American Army during the Philippine insurrection–they would do everything in their power to aid their own fellow countrymen.”

At my request, Quezon told me of his conversation in Malacañan with Litvinoff, the Russian diplomat, just before the war. The Russian warned him very seriously: “Be on your guard”–the same advice he then gave to General MacArthur and to Admiral Hart. Quezon thought highly of Litvinoff and says he believes the Russians knew more about Japan than the Japanese knew of Russia.

To turn back to a description of public sentiment in the Philippines, Quezon said he had known of course that he could get the Filipinos to raise an army, and he did. He also had been positive that he could bring the Filipinos into the war against Japan if their country were invaded–and he did so. But further than that, he could not tell, without full consultation with them, whether they would take any part in the “rising tide of color,” which is a movement sponsored by Japan as “Asia for the Asiatics.” But when he got out of Corregidor he learned how profound and widespread among the people was the spirit of resistance to the Japanese, and how deep was the hatred of the Filipinos for then. They had even threatened to kill Vargas, though they well knew that he, Quezon, had asked Vargas to stay there and care for Filipino interests as acting Mayor of Greater Manila. That if the Japanese now withdrew most of their forces from the Philippines for use elsewhere, leaving only a small garrison in the Islands, the Filipinos would kill every one of them. “For the first time I realized that we are really foreigners in the Orient.” He attributes this largely to their Christian religion. He stressed how deep was now the devotion to the United States of the Filipinos altho they were very angry at the “Old Timers.”

He still thinks that if the independence of the Philippines had been declared by Japan; that would have caused a revolution in India.

Quezon is seriously considering a plan for declaration of independence of the Philippines now. (N.B. that is what Quezon and MacArthur advised President Roosevelt to do in their Christmas cablegrams from Corregidor).

Quezon repeated his talk with Roosevelt at the signing of the United Nations pact in the White House yesterday by Quezon and by Mexico. This, he thinks is conclusive recognition of the Philippines as a “separate nation.” He thereupon asked Roosevelt if he was going to be admitted as a member of the Pacific War Council. Roosevelt replied that “Halifax wants India to have a seat there.” Quezon instantly answered that there would be a meeting of the Pacific War Council on Wednesday. (Quezon remarked to me that an appointment by the British Government of an Indian to sit on this council would be that of a sort of Quisling.)

So on Tuesday morning Quezon went to see Sumner Welles who spent an hour and ten minutes telling him in perfect Spanish how the Philippines deserved a seat on the Pacific War Council. He said he would find out what Roosevelt had meant, and would let Quezon know by telephone; which he did.

The Philippine President then turned, as he often did, to reflections on the very close co-operation he had enjoyed with General Douglas MacArthur during critical days in the Philippines. He recalled that in all circumstances, and at all times, the general had the most perfect manners and offered him every proper official deference; even later, when they were in Australia, he would never ride on the right of the seat in the motor car. In Melbourne, “where I was nothing, MacArthur would always come to my house to see me. If I visited his office, he would come down the ten stories from his office and stand until I was seated in the motor. He would never give promotions nor send orders to any of my people without first referring the matter to me. This was different from the methods of General Wainwright, who had succeeded to the command on Corregidor when MacArthur was ordered to Australia; he had promoted Manuel Roxas from the rank of Colonel to that of Brigadier General after I left Corregidor. I had deputized Roxas to act for me, but was not consulted as to his promotion, and I objected. The promotion was then not effected. I was the only authority who could fix the ranks in the Philippine Army. Unfortunately, I never had a chance to explain this to Roxas since I then lost all communication with him while he was in the mountains of Mindanao.

“Among my closest advisers during the invasion all, Santos, Osmeña, Yulo, Roxas, etc. played a man’s part. Roxas and Osmeña were the strongest among them for our sticking to the United States.

“As for General Lim, I found that a meeting during that time of strain was necessary with MacArthur, Lim and General Valdes, to curb Lim’s proposals, and to show them that they must not take their important orders from MacArthur while he was only my adviser without consulting me. During that brief period before MacArthur was given full command of the armies, I kept the sole authority to decide important questions.”

June 14-15, 1942

Conferences at the Shoreham with Major General Basilio Valdes, Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army and Minister of National Defense in the War Cabinet of Quezon. He gave me exact information as to the air fields, muster of the army, and in particular concerning his gallant exploit during the days from December 28th to 31st, 1941, when on orders from General MacArthur, he returned from Corregidor to Manila and successfully evacuated some four hundred wounded personnel from Sternberg Hospital in Manila on board a hastily devised hospital ship bound for Australia.

Modesty as to his own achievements is an outstanding feature of the character of General Valdes. His simple narrative, written at the time, is full of the breathless suspense of a great city just on the point of being occupied by the enemy.

June 15, 1942

Visited Pagu at San Marcelino police station. He was with Unson and several others. They were all thin and pale and their hair was cut short. I thought I would not be allowed to see them but the policemen let me in. They said they were arrested because of alleged distribution of enemy propaganda. I asked them how they were treated in Fort Santiago. They remained silent. I understood.

I promised to work for their release. Just keep on praying to God, I told them.

Talked to Phil about Bataan till past midnight.

June 14, 1942

At the Shoreham in Washington.

Quezon came in greatly exhilarated, having just signed the United Nations pact together with the Mexican Ambassador –with whom he left the White House, arm-in-arm, saying to the press: “This is not put on –this is the way our two countries really feel towards one another.”

Quezon remarked to me: “I believe absolutely in the sincerity of President Roosevelt,” and added: “This signing of the United Nations pact is a recognition of us as a separate nation.” He broadcast at 10:15 p.m., and told me: “This will known all over the Philippines if there is one short-wave receiver left to them.”

The next day he was still in high spirits, and was pleased with the pictures taken of him with President Roosevelt.

June 14, 1942

Philip released. He looked like a skeleton. He lost 56 pounds.